Painting Ourselves into a Corner: The Fundamental Paradoxes of Modern Warfare in Al Maqaleh v. Gates by Nikkel, Ashley C.
PAINTING OURSELVES INTO A CORNER:
THE FUNDAMENTAL PARADOXES OF
MODERN WARFARE IN
AL MAQALEH V. GATES
Ashley C. Nikkel*
See how few of the cases of the suspension of the habeas corpus law, have been
worthy of that suspension. They have been either real treason, wherein the parties
might as well have been charged at once, or sham plots, where it was shameful they
should ever have been suspected. Yet for the few cases wherein the suspension of the
habeas corpus has done real good, that operation is now become habitual and the
minds of the nation almost prepared to live under its constant suspension.1
INTRODUCTION
On a cold December morning in 2002, United States military personnel
entered a small wire cell at Bagram Airfield, in the Parwan province of Afghan-
istan. There, they found Dilawar, a 20-year-old Afghan taxi driver, hanging
naked and dead from the ceiling.2 The air force medical examiner who per-
formed Dilawar’s autopsy reported his legs had been beaten so many times the
tissue was “falling apart” and “had basically been pulpified.”3 The medical
examiner ruled his death a homicide, the result of an interrogation lasting four
days as Dilawar stood naked, his arms shackled over his head while U.S. inter-
rogators performed the “common peroneal strike,” a debilitating blow to the
side of the leg above the knee.4 The U.S. military detained Dilawar because he
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1 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in THOMAS JEFFERSON:
THOUGHTS ON WAR AND REVOLUTION, at 73 (Brett E. Woods ed., 2009).
2 TAXI TO THE DARK SIDE (Jigsaw Productions, Inc. 2007).
3 LAUREL E. FLETCHER & ERIC STOVER, THE GUANT ´ANAMO EFFECT: EXPOSING THE CONSE-
QUENCES OF U.S. DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PRACTICES 31 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
4 Id. at 31–32. Private Willie Brand, one of the Bagram guards prosecuted for prisoner
abuses, said in interviews that the knee strikes were taught at Bagram as a basic way to gain
prisoner compliance, even though they were only supposed to be used for self-defense. Tim
Golden, Abuse Cases Open Command Issues at Army Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2005, at
1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/08/national/nationalspecial3/08bagram.
html?pagewanted=all. Brand said, “So you just give them a common peroneal strike and
yank [the hood] down and be on your merry way. . . . It just seemed like the way to control
people.” Id.
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drove his taxi too close to a U.S. base at the wrong time, not because it found
him setting up an improvised explosive device near a routine transport route,
nor because he took up arms with the Taliban.5
Dilawar’s horrific death was one of many prisoner abuses at Bagram Air-
field since late 2001, thrusting the base into the national spotlight as the New
York Times and other media outlets began to investigate the abuses at Bagram.6
In the wake of this increased international scrutiny and the United States
Supreme Court’s decision opening federal courts to detainee habeas challenges
from Guanta´namo Bay Naval Base in Boumediene v. Bush,7 detainees at
Bagram filed habeas suits in federal court to seek release.8 The United States
District Court for the District of Columbia (“District Court”) consolidated these
cases into a single action, Al Maqaleh v. Gates, and held in August 2009 that
the Bagram detainees could indeed seek habeas relief in domestic courts.9
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
(“D.C. Circuit”) reversed this decision in May 2010 because the detainees’
location in an active “theater of war” precluded their access to federal courts
under Boumediene.10
The D.C. Circuit’s reversal revealed a fundamental paradox in the govern-
ment’s approach to the Afghan conflict and the “war on terror.”11 Presidents
Obama and Bush have insisted the nation cannot be at “war” with al Qaeda and
therefore the protections of the Geneva Conventions and other international law
5 TAXI TO THE DARK SIDE, supra note 2; see also Tim Golden, in U.S. Report, Brutal
Details of 2 Afghan Inmates’ Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2005, at 1, available at
www.nytimes.com/2005/05/20/international/asia/20abuse.html. The New York Times
reported   Dilawar, the son of an Afghan farmer, went to the provincial capital to get gas
money for his new taxi and picked up three men. Id. He headed back towards his village and
passed Camp Salerno, an American base that had been attacked by rockets that morning. Id.
Local militia stopped Dilawar at a checkpoint and turned him and his passengers over to
American soldiers. Id. Dilawar’s passengers were eventually detained at Guanta´namo for
more than a year before being sent home without a charge and said their treatment at Bagram
was far worse than Guanta´namo. Id.
6 See Bagram News Archive, INT’L JUST. NETWORK, www.ijnetwork.org/bagram-news-
room-52/72-bagram-news-archive (last updated Jan. 16, 2008).
7 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). The landmark Boumediene case held United
States’ “war on terror” detainees at Guanta´namo Bay could not be denied access of the writ
of habeas corpus simply because their site of detention was outside the territorial United
States. For further discussion of the case, see supra Part II(C).
8 See Al Maqalah v. Rumsfeld, No. 1:06-CV-01669 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2006); Wazir v. Rum-
sfeld, No. 1:06-CV-01697 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2006); Al-Bakri v. Bush, No. 1:08-CV-01307
(D.D.C. July 28, 2008); Al-Najar v. Gates, No. 1:08-CV-02143 (D.D.C. Dec. 10, 2008).
9 Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 232 (D.D.C. 2009), rev’d 605 F.3d 84, 98
(D.C. Cir. 2010).
10 Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 98. Military theorist Carl von Clausewitz defined the theater of
war as “a portion of the space over which war prevails . . . [consisting of] fortresses, or
important natural obstacles presented by the country, or even in its being separated by a
considerable distance from the rest of the space embraced in the war.” CARL VON CLAUSE-
WITZ, ON WAR: MILITARY FORCES 256 (J.J. Graham trans., N. Tru¨bner ed. 1873) (1832).
11 See President George W. Bush, Declaration of War on Terrorism (Sept. 20, 2001) (tran-
script available at http://www.britannica.com/bps/additionalcontent/8/398253/Document-
George-W-Bush-Declaration-of-War-on-Terrorism).
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do not apply to nor protect captured persons.12 When the Bagram detainees
challenged the legality of their detentions, the D.C. Circuit deferred to the exec-
utive’s judgment and denied habeas relief because Bagram was in an “active
theater of war in a territory under neither the de facto nor the de jure sover-
eignty of the United States.”13 This paradox puts Bagram detainees in a legal
“black hole”14 where they cannot obtain relief through traditional military jus-
tice (like Geneva-governed military commissions) and domestic courts refuse
to hear their habeas claims.
This Note argues the Bagram detainees are entitled to the same habeas
access the Supreme Court granted the Guanta´namo Bay detainees in
Boumediene. The two groups are sufficiently similar both in the context of their
captures and the degree of control the U.S. exercises over their sites of deten-
tion. Moreover, treating detainees like prisoners, rather than combatants, is a
crucial step toward conducting the war on terror in a way consummate with
international humanitarian values, including individual dignity, minimization of
civilian harm, and discriminate use of force. Though this Note skirts the torture
debate, the abuses at Bagram are actually symptomatic of larger accountability
issues in American military policy that deserve deeper scrutiny. Although the
D.C. Circuit’s decision in Al Maqaleh v. Gates identified valid practical mili-
tary concerns inherent in an “active theater of war,” such as access to judicial
functions and presentation of sensitive evidence, these concerns are not insur-
mountable. While courts should not discard claims of military necessity, the
D.C. Circuit’s reasoning in Al Maqaleh demonstrates applying anachronistic
precedent to habeas cases involving the practical concerns of modern warfare
leads to contradictory results. The nation is at war, but it refuses to treat the
people it detains as prisoners of war.
This paradoxical outcome ultimately stems from legislative inaction and
requires Congress to overhaul its approach to military actions in the Middle
East. Part I of this Note presents the case law federal courts rely upon in deter-
mining habeas rights during military conflict. Part II analyzes the interaction
between the Supreme Court’s precedent and the detention developments at
Guanta´namo Bay. Part III reviews the conditions at Bagram Airfield and the
District Court’s reversal in Al Maqaleh v. Gates. Part IV analyzes the D.C.
Circuit’s opinion and its paradoxical use of the “active theater of war” concept,
12 See Eric Schmitt, Afghan Prison Poses Problem in Overhaul of Detainee Policy, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 26, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/27/washington/27bagram.html?page
wanted=all.
13 Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (emphasis omitted). De jure
sovereignty refers to “formal” or “technical” sovereignty, like formal recognition of author-
ity by the government vis-a`-vis other governments, and is generally considered a political
question. Anthony J. Colangelo, “De Facto Sovereignty”: Boumediene and Beyond, 77
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 623, 626 (2009). De facto sovereignty, on the other hand, looks at
practical control and jurisdiction over a territory, like the laws and legal system governing
the territory. Id. De facto sovereignty is a type of political question as well, but the Court
may look to determinations of the executive or legislature governing jurisdiction and control
over the territory to determine if de facto sovereignty even exists. Id.
14 Geoffrey S. Corn, What Law Applies to the War on Terror?, in THE WAR ON TERROR
AND THE LAWS OF WAR: A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE 1, 7 (Michael W. Lewis ed., 2009) [here-
inafter Corn, What Law Applies]. Corn uses the term to describe the status of captured al
Qaeda operatives, and it certainly applies to Afghan detainees as well.
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which ultimately resulted in a misapplication of the Boumediene factor test.
Part V considers the nature of the armed conflict in Afghanistan in light of
military and legal definitions, given its context in the worldwide war on terror.
Part VI offers solutions for resolving the detention status of Bagram detainees
that require a revision of legislative and executive policy and a reconsideration
of “just war” theory in order to bring the war on terror back in line with funda-
mental American and international values.
I. OUTDATED ANALOGIES: A BRIEF HISTORY OF MILITARY CONFLICT IN
AMERICAN COURTS
The opinions in Al Maqaleh exemplify the typical line of cases federal
courts cite when analyzing detainees’ habeas claims, stretching all the way
back to the Civil War. These cases focus on one of the only legal vehicles
foreign nationals held by the U.S. have to challenge their detentions: the Sus-
pension Clause.15 It provides: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it.”16 Therefore, while the Suspension Clause allows Con-
gress to suspend the writ, it also implies that citizens will retain habeas rights in
all instances that do not involve rebellion, invasion, or public safety.17 Nonci-
tizen detainees have successfully used the Suspension Clause to challenge their
detentions, arguing that they have a right to the writ by virtue of being held in
U.S. custody.18 However, the D.C. Circuit’s struggle with applying a legal
framework to a modern theater of war reveals federal precedent is ill-equipped
to deal with the changing realities of warfare, as the analysis is highly contex-
tual and development of military technology and tactics often outpaces the judi-
ciary’s ability to distinguish between permissible and impermissible uses of
executive power.
Suspension Clause cases generally outline the parameters of executive
power during wartime, both domestically and internationally. A brief overview
of the three main eras of Suspension Clause cases—the Civil War, World War
II, and the Cold War—is necessary in order to understand the mindset of the
modern federal judiciary when it attempts to analogize current problems to old
solutions.
15 For comprehensive listing and discussion of cases, see Michael A. Rosenhouse, Con-
struction and Application of Suspension Clause of United States Constitution, U.S. Const.
art. I, § 9, cl. 2, 31 A.L.R.6th (2008).
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
17 Amanda L. Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 333, 336
(2006); see also Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 152 (C.C.D.Md. 1861).
18 The Clause protects the rights of the detained by affirming the duty and authority of the Judiciary
to call the jailer to account. . . . ‘The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of
procedure upon this [habeas] writ is, that it is directed to, and served upon, not the person
confined, but his jailer.’
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 745–67 (2008) (citations omitted).
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A. Limiting the Reach of Martial Law in Intrastate War: The Civil War
Era
Well before the Geneva Conventions of 1949, federal courts identified an
enduring principle: humanitarian needs and military necessity are natural ene-
mies of each other and extra scrutiny is necessary to ensure a harmonious bal-
ance between the two.19 This concept most powerfully arose out of two Civil
War Suspension Clause cases: Ex Parte Merryman20 and Ex Parte Milligan.21
After Chief Justice Taney issued a writ of habeas corpus in Merryman to secure
the release of a Confederate sympathizer in Maryland, the army ignored his
order.22 Taney’s subsequent blistering opinion emphasized that only Congress
has the power to suspend habeas corpus, not the president.23 Furthermore,
Taney insisted the U.S. government was “one of delegated and limited pow-
ers”24 and the president cannot “by force of arms, thrust aside the judicial
authorities and officers to whom the constitution has confided the power and
duty of interpreting and administering the laws, and substitute[ ] a military gov-
ernment in its place.”25 Lincoln, of course, ignored Taney.26
The Supreme Court issued a similar edict five years later in Milligan, but
the decision came down too late to effectively influence Lincoln’s prosecution
of the war.27 Justice David Davis recognized: “Martial law . . . destroys every
guarantee of the Constitution . . . . Civil liberty and this kind of martial law
cannot endure together; the antagonism is irreconcilable; and, in the conflict,
one or the other must perish.”28 Given the choice between military necessity
and civil liberty, the Court favored civil liberty, finding a suspected Confeder-
ate’s indefinite detention in Illinois, outside the area of active hostilities (or
theater of war), in violation of the Suspension Clause.29 Because the civilian
courts in Illinois were open and operating, the president lacked the constitu-
tional authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and establish a system of
military justice in its place.30
Merryman and Milligan hold intrastate war is not a blank check for the
president to substitute military judgment for domestic law.31 Merryman high-
19 BRIAN R. DIRCK, WAGING WAR ON TRIAL: A HANDBOOK WITH CASES, LAWS, AND DOCU-
MENTS 35–36 (2003).
20 Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 144, 147. Taney, as Chief Justice, wrote the opinion sitting
circuit for the United States Circuit Court for the District of Maryland. Id. at 147.
21 Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
22 DIRCK, supra note 19, at 88.
23 Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 148.
24 Id. at 149.
25 Id. at 152.
26 DIRCK, supra note 19, at 88. A month later, in defense of his action, Lincoln famously
noted before Congress that enforcement of Taney’s decision would let “all the laws, but one,
go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated.” Stephen I.
Vladeck, The Detention Power, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 163 (2004). For more details
on Lincoln’s rebuke, see id. at 162–64.
27 DIRCK, supra note 19, at 99–100.
28 Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 124–25 (1866).
29 Id. at 127.
30 Id.
31 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor echoed this sentiment in her Hamdi v. Rumsfeld plurality
opinion when she wrote, “[A] state of war is not a blank check for the President when it
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lights the difficult position of courts during times of war; the judiciary’s opin-
ions are not self-enforcing and courts must walk a line between vindicating
civil liberties and recognizing the need for military discretion in some cases.32
While Milligan’s protection of civil liberty is admirable, Lincoln chose not to
ignore the decision because peace and a sense of security had been reestab-
lished in the nation after General Lee surrendered.33 Merryman’s language, on
the other hand, more strongly rebuked the President’s claims, but because of its
wartime setting, it has joined Worcester v. Georgia34 as an example of the
executive’s willingness to flaunt the court’s opinions during times of crisis.35
B. Expanding Obligations in International War: The World War II Cases
Nearly 75 years later, the Supreme Court revisited its stance on the habeas
rights of prisoners to provide for more executive deference in Ex Parte Qui-
rin36 and Johnson v. Eisentrager,37 this time during an interstate conflict. The
two cases broadened the definition of “enemy combatant” to include enemy
foreign nationals while insisting upon humane treatment for those captured by
the United States during World War II.38 Quirin involved eight German sabo-
teurs, including one American citizen, captured on U.S. soil, clearly outside a
theater of war.39 Although the suspected spies claimed that under Milligan the
president lacked the authority to try their cases in front of military tribunals
because civilian courts were open and functioning,40 the Supreme Court found
Congress’ Articles of War divested any civilian court the authority to hear the
saboteurs’ claims without violating the Suspension Clause.41 Five days after
comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004).
For discussion on this, see infra Part II(A).
32 See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Creating Legal Rights for Suspected Terrorists: Is the Court
Being Courageous or Politically Pragmatic?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1975, 2051 (2009).
33 DIRCK, supra note 19, at 99–100.
34 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). The Supreme Court held President
Andrew Jackson could not constitutionally remove the Cherokee tribe in Georgia, but Jack-
son proceeded with the infamous Trail of Tears anyway. Ethan Davis, An Administrative
Trail of Tears: Indian Removal, 50 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 49, 62–63 (2010).
35 Merryman also retains little precedential value because it was an “in-chambers” opinion.
Typically, Circuit Judges would either grant or deny a habeas petition and only occasionally
would issue a short opinion with the decision. This opinion would not circulate among the
rest of the court before the decision was released. Regardless, Taney personally forwarded
the opinion to President Lincoln, determined to embarrass the administration to the greatest
degree possible. See Frank J. Williams et al., Still A Frightening Unknown: Achieving a
Constitutional Balance Between Civil Liberties and National Security During the War on
Terror, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 675, 689 (2007).
36 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
37 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
38 Jonathan Hafetz, Stretching Precedent Beyond Recognition: The Misplaced Reliance on
World War II Cases in the “War on Terror”, 28 REV. LITIG. 365, 369 (2008).
39 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 7–8. One group of the saboteurs landed with four crates of explosives
on Amagnsett Beach, Long Island, dressed in civilian clothing while the others came ashore
at Ponte Vedra, Florida. David J. Danelski, The Saboteurs’ Case, 1 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 61,
63–65 (1996).
40 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 19.
41 Id. at 48.
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President Roosevelt received the Supreme Court’s opinion, the military electro-
cuted six of the eight prisoners.42
Eisentrager presented the Court with a more complicated question
because the enemy aliens in question were captured in the China theater and
tried by a military commission convened by President Roosevelt and Congress,
which found the Germans guilty of war crimes.43 After the German surrender,
the prisoners were moved to serve out their sentences at the Landsberg Prison
in Allied-occupied Germany and they filed habeas claims in federal court seek-
ing their release.44 However, the Supreme Court dismissed their petitions
because, as enemy aliens, they were held at an Allied-controlled base beyond
the territorial reaches of the United States and its courts.45 Justice Robert Jack-
son opined: “at no relevant time were [the prisoners] within any territory over
which the United States is sovereign, and the scenes of their offense, their cap-
ture, their trial and their punishment were all beyond the territorial jurisdiction
of . . . the United States.”46 Transporting the prisoners to the United States by
sea would also have imposed a considerable burden on military authorities.47
Therefore, by the end of World War II, it became clear that prisoners of
war who were afforded due process rights (however limited they may be) in
accordance with Geneva, and who were detained in U.S. control outside the
territorial reach and de facto sovereignty of the United States, could not claim
habeas rights in federal court. However, the Eisentrager and Quirin decisions
were specific to the circumstances of World War II, a traditional armed conflict
with an identifiable enemy, defined battlefields, and a clear ending point.48
Even though the Supreme Court compared the Guanta´namo Bay cases to these
two World War II cases in Boumediene, the differences between 1940s battle-
fields and modern warfare led to incongruent analogies.49
42 Danelski, supra note 39, at 72. Later, Justice Frankfurter called the case “not a happy
precedent.” Justice Black’s law clerk described the case as an instance “of haste [where] the
Court allowed itself to be stampeded.” Id. at 80 (alteration in original).
43 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 766.
44 Id. at 766–67.
45 Id. at 784–85.
46 Id. at 778.
47 Id. at 779.
To grant the writ to these prisoners might mean that our army must transport them across the sea
for hearing. This would require allocation of shipping space, guarding personnel, billeting and
rations. It might also require transportation for whatever witnesses the prisoners desired to call as
well as transportation for those necessary to defend [the] legality of the sentence.
Id. at 778–79.
48 Hafetz, supra note 38, at 377.
49 Id. According to Hafetz, the Bush administration “has tried to defend its position against
legal challenges by relying on precedents from World War II. But none of those decisions
contemplate, let alone approve, the sweeping and unreviewable executive power asserted in
their name.” Id. Michael Ratner argues Quirin was inapplicable to the Guanta´namo Bay
detainees because it involved declared war between two nation-states and the prisoners were
working directly for the German enemy. MICHAEL RATNER & ELLEN RAY, GUANT ´ANAMO:
WHAT THE WORLD SHOULD KNOW 21 (2004). Furthermore, the prisoners were provided with
a trial, not simply detained indefinitely without a hearing. Id.
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C. Legal Land Mines: The Cold War Era
Although international obligations grew and military tactics and strategy
developed, the Supreme Court’s approach to prisoners’ habeas rights did not.
The United States joined the United Nations in 1945, signed the Geneva Con-
ventions in 1949, and obligated itself to dozens of different protocols since that
time, many of which clearly operate when countries officially declare war
against each other.50 However, no declaration of war has supported the United
States’ participation in any armed conflict since World War II—President Tru-
man fought the Korean War pursuant to a United Nations resolution, President
Johnson relied on the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution to deploy troops in Vietnam,
and President Bush received approval to use armed force against Iraq in the
First Gulf War from both houses of Congress.51 While Congress appropriated
funds for the military effort, it did so without an official declaration, which
would have clearly invoked international humanitarian obligations.52
However, even without an official declaration of war, U.S. foreign policy
operated under the assumption that “U.S. forces would comply with the princi-
ples of the law of war during any military operation no matter how that opera-
tion was legally characterized.”53 As a result, detainees were treated “as if”
they were prisoners of war, and the laws of war were applied to a variety of
difficult combat situations, including operational decision-making for detention
in Kosovo, medical treatment obligations in Haiti, the use of military power in
Bosnia, and detainee interrogations in Somalia.54
Despite the many conflicts the United States involved itself in during this
time, no American court ever needed to review the president’s procedures for
captures and interning battlefield prisoners,55 as the Department of Defense
abided by the customs of war by treating captured enemies as if they were
prisoners of war. However, this stasis eventually resulted in a fifty-year gap in
the Supreme Court’s Suspension Clause case law. Although the American mili-
tary faced a changing style of combat and new enemies during that time, Eisen-
trager was the last time the Supreme Court dealt with the Suspension Clause
head-on before the war on terror. As the Supreme Court soon learned, the
world had changed dramatically since 1950 and its precedent failed to recog-
50 See Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 97, 108 (2004).
51 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 218
(1998).
52 Id.; see also Corn, What Law Applies, supra note 14, at 15.
53 Corn, Introduction, in THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 14, at
xiii-xiv [hereinafter Corn, Introduction].
54 Id. at xiv. But see Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. Passed after the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, the Act authorizes
the Attorney General to initiate special “Alien Terrorist Removal Procedures” against non-
citizens terrorist suspects and detain them until they are deported; in the event no country
will accept the suspect, he or she will be held indefinitely. 8 U.S.C. § 1537(2)(B)-(C) (2006).
Though the Act applies to terror suspects on American soil, its approach foreshadows the
Bush Administration’s ultimate choice to extend indefinite detention to terror suspects cap-
tured on foreign soil as well.
55 Ruth Wedgwood, The Supreme Court and the Guanta´namo Controversy, in TERRORISM,
THE LAWS OF WAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION: DEBATING THE ENEMY COMBATANT CASES
159, 159–61 (Peter Berkowitz ed., 2005).
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nize the new realities of battle, where the enemy was not as clear as it once
was.
II. CRITICAL MASS: ENEMY COMBATANTS AND GUANT ´ANAMO BAY
A. Changing Policy, Changing Warfare
In the wake of 9/11, the operational assumption that detainees would be
treated “as if” they were prisoners of war under Article 3 of the Geneva Con-
ventions56 was quickly overridden by senior executive branch policymakers
who imposed a new category of detention: the unlawful enemy combatant.57
The designation stemmed from Geneva and Hague distinctions between lawful
and unlawful combatants: lawful combatants have a fixed distinctive emblem
recognizable at a distance, carry arms openly, and conduct operations in accor-
dance with the laws and customs of war,58 while unlawful combatants do not
fulfill all of the conditions of regular forces (for example, they might not wear a
uniform), but are nonetheless engaged in the hostilities.59 International humani-
tarian law values this distinction because it encourages a clear line between
civilians and soldiers, which promotes civilian safety because the enemy is
readily identifiable.60
To discourage soldiers from disguising themselves as civilians, the draft-
ers of the Geneva and Hague Conventions agreed that soldiers who engage in
warfare as irregular or unlawful combatants would lose their “prisoner of war”
status if captured.61 The United States has balked at applying the “prisoner of
war” label to persons captured in the Afghan conflict because “[e]quating ter-
rorists with soldiers . . . lends credence to their contention that they are engaged
in an armed struggle with the United States, a fight between opposing forces,
each claiming legitimacy,” when they are no more than bandits and outlaws.62
56 Common Article 3 provides a minimum humanitarian standard for treatment of detainees
in both international and non-international armed conflicts, prohibiting torture as well as
cruel and degrading treatment. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. Article 4 governs the classifica-
tion and treatment of prisoners of war and civilians. Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S.
No. 3365.
57 Corn, Introduction, supra note 53, at xv.
58 Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex:
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 1, Oct. 18, 1907, 3
NRGT, 3 se´rie 464; see also Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 13, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217;
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 13, Aug. 12, 1949; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, art. 4, 13, 27–34, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365.
59 INGRID DETTER, THE LAW OF WAR 136–37 (2d ed. 2000).
60 MICHAEL BYERS, WAR LAW: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT 118 (2005).
61 Id. Byers notes that U.S. Special Forces took to wearing civilian clothing for a while in
Afghanistan, but the practice was eventually halted when the administration realized the
risks in doing so. Id.
62 JOHNATHAN HAFETZ, HABEAS CORPUS AFTER 9/11: CONFRONTING AMERICA’S NEW
GLOBAL DETENTION SYSTEM 210 (2010).
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However, the incentives to receive prisoner of war status and avoid mal-
treatment are not always effective, especially for irregular forces like guerilla or
resistance fighters in poorer countries.63 For example, the armed forces of the
Taliban government, apart from the turbans, wore nothing suggesting a uniform
during the 2001 U.S.-Afghanistan war.64 Even though Taliban forces were
clearly in the chain of command, carried arms openly, and for the most part
abided by international humanitarian law, they were technically unlawful com-
batants.65 The situation in Afghanistan suggests the old distinction between
combatants and noncombatants might be ill-adapted for the changing nature of
modern warfare, especially considering unique challenges like kinship net-
works harboring terrorists, child soldiers, the rise of private security firms, and
economic and technological warfare.66
While the Geneva Conventions specify humane treatment for prisoners of
war, it is silent as to the treatment of unlawful combatants.67 The question of
unlawful combatants did not present itself in the pre-9/11 era due to the Depart-
ment of Defense’s choice to treat all detainees as if they were prisoners of
war.68 However, the capture of the so-called “Twentieth Hijacker,” Mohammed
al-Qahtani, forced policymakers to confront this issue head-on as they sought to
“use every tool and weapon—including the advantages presented by the laws
of war—to win the war.”69
B. Down a Dark Path: The Road to Bagram
Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”)
on September 18, 2001, authorizing the president to “use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001.”70 Presented with the question of where to detain sus-
pected terrorists, an inter-agency task force composed of lawyers from the
White House and the Departments of Defense, State, and Justice decided, “any
detention facility should be located outside the United States.”71 The military
63 BYERS, supra note 60, at 128.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 ERIC PATTERSON, JUST WAR THINKING: MORALITY AND PRAGMATISM IN THE STRUGGLE
AGAINST CONTEMPORARY THREATS 69 (2009).
67 Persons who are not found to be prisoners of war may be released if innocent, may be
held in a secure situation if they are engaged in hostile activities that threaten the security of
the state, or interrogated or tried for war crimes if appropriate. RATNER & RAY, supra note
49, at 16; see also Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art.
102, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
68 Corn, Introduction, supra note 53, at xiv-xv.
69 Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Remarks to the American Bar Association
Standing Committee on Law and National Security (Feb. 24, 2004), available at http://
www.fas.org/irp/news/2004/02/gonzales.pdf.
70 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) [here-
inafter “2001 AUMF”].
71 JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR
142 (2006). The task force researched whether courts would have jurisdiction over the facil-
ity, wary of the possibility that federal courts would substitute peacetime standards for the
current military needs. Id. While no location was perfect, the U.S. Naval Station at Guanta´-
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transferred its first twenty detainees to Guanta´namo Bay Naval Base in early
200272 and al-Qahtani followed shortly thereafter.73 As detainees refused to
cooperate with interrogators, the Joint Task Force at Guanta´namo began to con-
sider the use of harsher techniques, including sleep deprivation and waterboard-
ing—activities that could violate the Geneva Conventions.74 In December
2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld responded by approving a list of
sixteen techniques in December 2002 that military personnel at Guanta´namo
Bay could utilize aside from the methods contained in the Army Field Man-
ual.75 One of al-Qahtani’s interrogators described his subsequent interrogation
as a “free for all,”76 utilizing twenty-hour-per-day interrogations for fifty days,
coupled with isolation, sensory deprivation, and extreme temperatures.77 Inter-
rogators forced al-Qahtani to wear women’s underwear, sexually harassed him,
forced him to perform dog tricks, and administered enemas.78 Al-Qahtani
namo Bay “seemed to fit the bill.” Id. Ret. Rear Admiral John Hutson, a former Judge
Advocate General with 30 years military experience, said in his interview for TAXI TO THE
DARK SIDE that upon hearing the United States was shipping high-value detainees to Guanta´-
namo, he thought
‘Good, safe place! You know, put them there, barbed wire all over.’ Then it became apparent
that the reason we were doing it was because we were going to argue that there’s no law. You
know, Cuban law didn’t apply. U.S. law didn’t apply. Well, that was a big step down the slippery
slope.
TAXI TO THE DARK SIDE, supra note 2.
72 FLETCHER & STOVER, supra note 3, at 5.
73 Neil A. Lewis, Fresh Details Emerge on Harsh Methods at Guanta´namo, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 1, 2005, at A11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/01/national/
01gitmo.html. The U.S. military had al-Qahtani in custody for over eight months before it
realized he might be the twentieth hijacker. TAXI TO THE DARK SIDE, supra note 2.
74 Email from Peter Zolper, Assistant Chief Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, to Mark
Fallon, Deputy Commander, Criminal Investigation Task Force (Aug. 27, 2003, 4:02PM),
available at http://torturingdemocracy.org/documents/20021002.pdf (Counter Resistance
Strategy Meeting Minutes).
75 Lewis, supra note 73. The sixteen approved techniques included forced nudity, stress
positions, religious humiliation, isolation of up to thirty days (with possible extensions after
command approval), light and sound deprivation, exploitation of phobias and “mild non-
injurious physical contact.” Declaration of Gitanjali S. Gutierrez, Esq., Lawyer for Moham-
med al Qahtani, available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/Publication_Declarationon
AlQahtani.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2011).
76 Interview by investigating officer with LTG Randall M. Schmidt at Davis Mountain Air
Force Base, Ariz. (Aug. 24, 2005) available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/tortur-
ingdemocracy//documents/20050825.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2011) (declassified version).
In his oral report before Congress, Schmidt concluded that while each of these individual
techniques might not amount to torture, cumulatively they had abusive and degrading effects
on detainees. Id.
77 TAXI TO THE DARK SIDE, supra note 2.
78 Id.; CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS, TESTIMONY OF AN INTER-
ROGATION LOG (Jan. 11, 2003), http://humanrights.ucdavis.edu/projects/the-guantanamo-tes-
timonials-project/testimonies/testimony-of-an-interrogation-log. “There are at least ten
separate instances when the interrogation log reports that interrogators used a technique
labeled ‘invasion of space by a female’ . . . [including] a female interrogator straddling Mr.
al Qahtani and molesting him while other military guards pin his body to the floor against his
will.” Declaration of Gitanjali S. Gutierrez, supra note 75, at 6. The log also details an
incident where interrogators placed a mask on al Qahtani and forced him to undergo “dance
instruction” with a male interrogator. Id.
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began to exhibit behavior consistent with extreme psychological trauma, “talk-
ing to non-existent people, reportedly hearing voices, crouching in a corner of
the cell covered with a sheet for hours on end.”79 The military suspended these
techniques the next month after navy lawyers complained the methods were
definitely excessive, and possibly illegal under Geneva.80 Upon review, Rum-
sfeld issued a final policy in April 2003 consisting of twenty-four approved
techniques,81 many of which were already being used without authorization at
Bagram.82
The al-Qahtani interrogation and the interrogation techniques used in
Bagram and Abu Ghraib prompted policymakers in the Bush administration to
consider the legal ramifications of the interrogators’ actions more closely.83
Bush’s legal advisors ultimately exploited the legal vacuum surrounding armed
conflict between a state and a non-state entity (the U.S. and al Qaeda), which
did not fit neatly into Geneva Common Articles 2 or 3.84 The administration
eventually argued that the conduct of interrogators did not violate international
humanitarian law, and even if it did, it was justifiable as military necessity.85
However, as international scrutiny of interrogation techniques and deten-
tion conditions increased,86 many members of the legal community became
dissatisfied with the Bush administration’s justifications and filed habeas
actions on behalf of the Guanta´namo detainees.87 The resulting line of cases—
Rasul v. Bush,88 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,89 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,90 and
Boumediene v. Bush91—eventually concluded that Guanta´namo detainees
could challenge their detentions in federal court.92 However, by the time the
Supreme Court reached its decision in Boumediene, it had created a framework
littered with unforeseen pitfalls that would soon reveal themselves in the Al
Maqaleh decisions.
79 Declaration of Gitanjali S. Gutierrez, supra note 75, at 3.
80 Lewis, supra note 73; see also Declaration of Gitanjali S. Gutierrez, supra note 75, at 2.
81 Lewis, supra note 73. The new list of techniques included environmental manipulation
and threats to send the detainee to a country allowing torture; Declaration of Gitaniali S.
Gutierrez, supra note 75, at 2.
82 TAXI TO THE DARK SIDE, supra note 2.
83 JORDAN J. PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S UNLAWFUL
RESPONSES TO THE “WAR” ON TERROR 25–34 (2007).
84 See supra Part I.
85 Corn, Introduction, supra note 53, at xiv.
86 For example, in 2002, Lieutenant Colonel Diane Beaver of the Army’s Judge Advocate
General Corps (JAG) told military and intelligence officials that, “[w]e may need to curb the
harsher operations with the ICRC [International Commission of the Red Cross] is
around. . . . it is better not to expose them to any controversial techniques. . . . This would
draw a lot of negative attention.” Email from Peter Zolper to Mark Fallon, supra note 74, at
3.
87 The Center for Constitutional Rights was the main organization spearheading the habeas
actions. For a list of all fifty-seven of its cases, see Guanta´namo Bay Habeas Decision
Scorecard, CENTER FOR CONST. RTS., http://ccrjustice.org/GTMOscorecard (last visited Oct.
17, 2011).
88 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
89 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
90 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
91 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
92 Id. at 732, 798.
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C. Judicial-Executive Tug-of-War: The Guanta´namo Bay Challenges
The first challenges to the detention program came in the form of Rasul
and Hamdi, both decisions handed down on June 28, 2004, by the Supreme
Court.93 Sixteen detainees—two British, two Australian, and twelve Kuwaiti
citizens—brought the Rasul action, seeking a writ of habeas corpus in federal
court.94 In the 6 to 3 Rasul decision, the Supreme Court held Guanta´namo
prisoners could challenge the lawfulness of their detention in federal court
because Cuba’s “ultimate sovereignty” over the base did not preclude access.95
On the other hand, in Hamdi, a plurality of the Court found the govern-
ment could detain an American citizen as an enemy combatant pursuant to the
AUMF, but had to offer him the opportunity to challenge the factual basis for
his detention with the benefit of a fair hearing before a neutral tribunal and
access to counsel.96 Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion warned “a state of
war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the
Nation’s citizens.”97 O’Connor thought the war against the Taliban closely
resembled wars of the past, and the president’s traditional war powers likely
did not apply in the war against al Qaeda or in conflicts against other non-state
actors.98 Furthermore, as critical as the Government’s interest may have been
in addressing immediate threats to national security, “history and common
sense teach us that an unchecked system of detention carries the potential to
become a means for oppression and abuse of others who do not present that sort
of threat.”99 O’Connor concluded enemy combatant proceedings should be
carefully tailored to alleviate “their uncommon potential to burden the Execu-
tive at a time of ongoing military conflict.”100 Therefore, the Court attempted
to strike a balance in Rasul and Hamdi: although the president could detain
unlawful combatants, the administration needed to provide basic due process
for captured persons.
In response to the Rasul and Hamdi decisions, the government responded
twofold to limit due process for Guanta´namo detainees: first with the Combat-
ant Status Review Tribunal (“CSRT”)101 and then with the Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005 (“DTA”).102 A mere nine days after the Rasul and Hamdi deci-
sions, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz issued a memo that
93 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 466; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 507.
94 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 470–72.
95 Id. at 471, 484–85. Kennedy stressed the significance of the 1903 lease agreement
between the United States and Cuba, which allows the United States indefinite control over
the base for “two thousand dollars, in gold coin of the United States” per year. Id. at 471 n.2
(internal quotation marks omitted). A 1934 treaty between the two countries effectively
stripped Cuba of any rights as a sovereign unless the two parties agree to modify the 1903
lease, which they have not. Id. at 471.
96 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509, 517.
97 Id. at 536.
98 See id. at 521.
99 Id. at 530.
100 Id. at 533.
101 Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary of
the Navy, Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July 7, 2004), http://
www.defense.gov/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf [hereinafter Wolfowitz].
102 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2006) (codified
as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 801 and 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006)) [hereinafter DTA].
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allowed Guanta´namo detainees to contest their designations as enemy combat-
ants.103 The CSRT allowed the detainees to consult a “personal representative”
(a military officer “with the appropriate security clearance”) to review “any
reasonably available information” possessed by the Department of Defense
regarding the detainee’s classification.104 After a preparation and consultation
period of thirty days, the Department of Defense would convene a tribunal,
composed of three neutral commissioned military officers, to review the
detainee’s status.105 However, the rules of evidence did not apply and the tribu-
nal allowed admission of hearsay.106 The detainee could only call “reasonably
available” witnesses and the memo created a rebuttable presumption in favor of
the government’s evidence.107 Therefore, although the executive branch com-
plied with the Court’s mandate for a neutral tribunal before which detainees
could challenge their classifications as “enemy combatants,” the limited due
process protections led to criticism that the CSRTs were not in place to dis-
cover the truth about the detainees, but rather to prolong their detentions.108
Anticipating more judicial challenges from Guanta´namo detainees due to
the shortcomings of the CSRT process, Congress finally entered the fray on
December 30, 2005, by passing the Detainee Treatment Act.109 The Act
amended 28 U.S.C § 2241, the federal habeas statute, and stripped federal
courts of their jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions filed by detainees.110
Couched in language about prohibiting “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treat-
ment” of persons in the United States’ custody,111 the Act codified Wolfowitz’s
CSRT memo112 and provided, “no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdic-
tion to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on
behalf of an alien detained by the Department of Defense at Guanta´namo Bay,
Cuba.”113
The DTA threw pending habeas claims by Guanta´namo detainees, like
that of Salim Ahmed Hamdan (allegedly Osama bin Laden’s chauffer and bod-
103 Wolfowitz, supra note 101, at 1.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 2–3.
107 Id.
108 DARREN A. WHEELER, PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN ACTION: IMPLEMENTING SUPREME
COURT DETAINEE DECISIONS 40 (2008). Joseph Blocher argues the CSRT actually had the
perverse effect of solidifying Guanta´namo detainees’ claims to POW status
because of the substantial similarities between the definitions of ‘enemy combatant’ and ‘pris-
oner of war[.]’ Classification as an enemy combatant by a CSRT actually supports, rather than
precludes, a finding of POW status. Thus, the CSRTs could not strip detainees of their presump-
tive POW status simply by finding them to be enemy combatants.
Joseph Blocher, Comment, Combatant Status Review Tribunals: Flawed Answers to the
Wrong Question, 116 YALE L.J. 667, 671 (2007).
109 DTA, supra note 102, at § 1001.
110 Id. § 1005(e)(1). The DTA was part of a Department of Defense Appropriations Act for
“Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico and
Pandemic Influenza.” Id.
111 Id. § 1003.
112 Id. § 1005(a).
113 Id. § 1005(e)(1).
Spring 2012] PAINTING OURSELVES INTO A CORNER 457
yguard),114 into chaos because it was unclear if pending claims could still be
heard by federal courts.115 The Supreme Court, in its 5 to 3 Hamdan v. Rum-
sfeld decision, found the DTA did not retroactively strip habeas jurisdiction
over pending cases.116 Furthermore, the Court invalidated the system of mili-
tary tribunals the Bush administration created in the wake of 9/11 because the
system violated Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.117 The administration
modeled these tribunals after those President Roosevelt used to try the prison-
ers in Quirin and Eisentrager, but the new tribunals lacked the express authori-
zation from Congress, either by statute or declaration of war.118
At President Bush’s behest, Congress responded yet again, this time in the
form of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (“MCA”), which scholars have
called “a harsh rebuke of the Hamdan court.”119 In order to provide President
Bush with the “tools he need[ed] to protect [the] country” by allowing military
tribunals to provide swift justice for terrorists and to combat future attacks,120
Section 7 of the MCA struck the DTA’s amendment to the federal habeas stat-
ute and inserted a new subsection:
[N]o court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application
for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United
States who has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained
as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such a determination.121
The MCA avoided the pitfalls of Hamdan’s challenge by ensuring that its
provisions would apply to pending cases as well.122 The Act also defined new
offenses the Commission could try,123 permitted testimony obtained through
coercive techniques,124 and even prohibited combatants from invoking the pro-
tections of the Geneva Conventions.125 The jurisdiction-stripping provisions of
the MCA triggered Suspension Clause concerns, setting the stage for
Boumediene, the principal case in the Guanta´namo litigation.
114 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 570 (2006).
115 Id. at 574–75.
116 Id. at 584 n.15. Chief Justice John Roberts recused himself from consideration of the
case due to his participation in the Court of Appeals decision.
117 Id. at 631–32.
118 See id. at 563, 567, 597, 627.
119 Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006), [hereinafter
MCA]; Michael Greenberger, You Ain’t Seen Nothin’ Yet: The Inevitable Post-Hamdan Con-
flict Between the Supreme Court and the Political Branches, 66 MD. L. REV. 805, 811
(2007).
120 Carl Hulse & Kate Zernike, Legislation Advances On Terrorism Trials, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 28, 2006, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/28/washington/
28detain.html.
121 MCA, supra note 119, at § 950j(b). The removal of specific geographic references in the
new language indicated Congress’s awareness of the administration’s intent to move the bulk
of detention activities away from Guanta´namo.
122 Id.
123 Id. § 950v. These offenses include torture, cruel or inhuman treatment, murder or
destruction of property in violation of laws of war, providing material support for terrorism,
and wrongfully aiding the enemy. Id.
124 Id. § 949a.
125 Id. § 948b(g). Sec. 948a(I)(i) defines unlawful enemy combatants as members of the
Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces, meaning that a determination of membership in
either group automatically results in a status determination of unlawful enemy combatant.
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Born in Algeria, Bosnian citizen Lakhdar Boumediene had his habeas
claim joined with those of approximately seventy other Guanta´namo detainees
by the time it reached the Supreme Court.126 Boumediene challenged his deten-
tion on the grounds that Section 7 of the MCA violated the Suspension Clause
by denying habeas rights without an adequate alternative.127 In a 5 to 4 deci-
sion, the Supreme Court rejected the Bush administration’s argument that
noncitizen enemy combatants at Guanta´namo are not entitled to the writ of
habeas corpus or Suspension Clause protection because Guanta´namo was
outside the United States’ territorial borders.128 The Court dismissed the gov-
ernment’s claims that the de jure sovereignty (legal control) over Guanta´namo
Bay was more important than de facto (practical) control because questions of
extraterritoriality actually “turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not
formalism.”129 According to Justice Kennedy, “Even when the United States
acts outside its borders, its powers are not ‘absolute and unlimited’ but are
subject ‘to such restrictions as are expressed in the Constitution.’”130 The gov-
ernment could not claim that Guanta´namo Bay’s location within the borders of
another country limited the reach of constitutional rights to persons held by the
United States.131 Rather, the Suspension Clause protects the detainee’s right to
use the judiciary to call the jailor (the United States) to account for the deten-
tion when circumstances so warrant.132
Consequently, the Court crafted a test for determining the reach of the
Suspension Clause in the absence of American de jure sovereignty, consisting
of at least three factors: “(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the
adequacy of the process through which the status determination was made; (2)
the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and
(3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the
writ.”133 In analyzing these factors, the Court analogized the Guanta´namo
detainees to the World War II prisoners in Eisentrager and the conditions at
Landsberg Prison in order to determine if access to federal courts would be
appropriate for detainees given the degree of U.S. control at Guanta´namo.134
Under the first factor, although the Guanta´namo detainees were not Amer-
ican citizens, they lacked an adequate forum to challenge their classifications as
enemy combatants.135 The CSRT did not provide a remotely adequate alterna-
tive to habeas review because the “personal representatives” did not act as
advocates and detainees could not overcome the evidentiary burdens placed on
126 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008).
127 Id.
128 Id. at 739, 771.
129 Id. at 764.
130 Id. at 765 (quoting Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 44 (1885)).
131 Id. at 755.
132 See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 439–41 (2004); In re Jackson, 15 Mich. 417,
439–41 (1867); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973).
133 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766.
134 Id. at 766–70.
135 Id. at 766. Furthermore, the review process could not cure all defects of an earlier pro-
ceeding because the CSRT process did not provide for an appeal that would consider the
initial status determination. Id. at 767.
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them.136 Therefore, although the petitioners were noncitizens, the process
through which their status determination as enemy combatants was made
lacked basic due process.137
The Court’s application of the second factor stressed that the Boumediene
detainees were similar to the Eisentrager prisoners “in that the sites of their
apprehension and detention [were] technically outside the sovereign territory of
the United States.”138 This fact would weigh against extending habeas rights to
the petitioners, except the Court had to deal with the “critical differences”
between Landsberg Prison in 1950 and Guanta´namo Bay in 2008.139 The
United States’ control over Landsberg Prison in Eisentrager was neither “abso-
lute nor indefinite,” as the U.S. military had to share control of the area with the
combined Allied forces140 and the Court had no need to extend constitutional
protections to territories the United States did not intend to govern indefi-
nitely.141 On the other hand, Guanta´namo Bay was “no transient possession” of
the United States and “[i]n every practical sense, Guanta´namo [was] not
abroad; it [was] within constant jurisdiction of the United States”142 because
the base was under complete and total American control143 and occupied on an
indefinite basis.144 Therefore, the government could not deny the protections of
domestic law to the detainees.145
The Court’s analysis of the third factor highlighted the great monetary and
tactical costs of holding the Suspension Clause applicable to military detentions
abroad,146 but the costs were not dispositive in Kennedy’s mind because civil-
ian courts and the armed forces had functioned alongside each other in the
past.147 The Government presented “no credible arguments that the military
mission at Guanta´namo would be compromised if” the detainees had access to
federal courts, due to the United States’ plenary control over the Guanta´namo
136 Id. at 767.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 768.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. See also the Insular Cases: De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 181 (1901); Dooley v.
United States, 182 U.S. 222, 235 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243, 244
(1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 249 (1901); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197,
211 (1903); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 139 (1904). The Insular Cases lay out the
doctrine of territorial incorporation, where the constitution applies in full in incorporated
territories surely destined for statehood, but only in part in unincorporated areas.
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 757. In unincorporated areas, the United States must provide nonci-
tizen inhabitants guarantees of certain fundamental personal rights declared by the Constitu-
tion. Id. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74–76 (1957), outlined four factors to determine which
rights would be provided to noncitizens: (1) practical circumstances, (2) practical necessities,
(3) possible alternatives Congress had before it, and (4) whether judicial enforcement of the
Constitutional provision would be impractical and anomalous. Id. at 759–60. Boumediene’s
three-part test seems to be a refinement of these factors. See id.
142 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 768–69.
143 Id. at 771.
144 Id. at 768.
145 Id. at 771.
146 Id. at 769.
147 Id. Unfortunately, the Court’s emphasis on tactical, rather than monetary costs makes
dollar-to-dollar comparison between cases difficult.
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base.148 The Court analyzed the tactical nature of the Guanta´namo Bay Naval
Base and Landsberg Prison and found the security threats posed by post-World
War II German occupations justified denying the Eisentrager prisoners access
to U.S. courts.149 However, the same practical concerns were not present at
Guanta´namo because the detainees were “contained in a secure prison facility
located on an isolated and heavily fortified military base.”150 Thus, the Suspen-
sion Clause had full effect at Guanta´namo151 and because the CSRT process
was not an adequate habeas alternative,152 the Guanta´namo prisoners could
challenge their detentions in federal court.153 In language that would later
prove problematic in Al Maqaleh, the Court speculated: “if the detention facil-
ity were located in an active theater of war, arguments that issuing the writ
would be ‘impracticable or anomalous’ would have more weight.”154
While the Supreme Court’s ruling appeared to be a victory for proponents
of international humanitarian obligations, Kennedy’s analysis misrepresented
the weight of the three factors and thus set the stage for the conflict in Al
Maqaleh. Even though the geographic location of the detention center is impor-
tant, geography alone never determines the reach of the habeas writ.155 Further-
more, the Supreme Court’s framework fails to specifically account for the
duration of a detainee’s incarceration—as the length of detention increases, the
government’s war powers justification for denying due process rights weakens
as the prisoner no longer poses an imminent threat to military personnel.156
Finally, in analyzing the practical concerns of extending the writ, the focus
of the inquiry is not whether allowing access to federal courts would disrupt the
war effort as a whole, but rather if a reasonable relationship exists “between the
government’s power to wage war and its efforts to suspend” the writ for the
individual detainee.157 For example, when the U.S. captures and detains a per-
son outside the war zone, be it an enemy soldier or a civilian, a reasonable
relationship likely does not exist between the two because it is improbable the
person’s actions would have a direct impact on the war effort.158 On the other
148 Id. (emphasis added).
149 Id. at 769–70. In post-World War II Germany, the United States became responsible for
an occupation zone of more than 57,000 sq. mi. with a population of 18 million. Id. at 769.
U.S. forces there faced a variety of enemy attacks, including guerilla-fighters and “were-
wolves,” id. at 769–70, a Nazi insurgency group. Perry Biddiscombe, Donald and Me: The
Iraq War and the “Werwolf” Analogy, 59 INT’L J. 669, 669 (2004).
150 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 770.
151 Id. at 771.
152 Id. at 792.
153 Id. at 798.
154 Id. at 770.
155 Marc D. Falkoff & Robert Knowles, Bagram, Boumediene, and Limited Government,
59 DEPAUL L. REV. 851, 891–92 (2010).
156 Id. at 892. In the district court opinion, Judge Bates read Boumediene’s language about
“at least three factors” as an invitation to add another factor he viewed as relevant—the
length of detention. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp.2d 205, 214–16 (D.D.C. 2009)
(emphasis added). However, with such flexible language, an appellate court could just as
easily determine that the additional factor improperly expanded the scope of the test, which
is exactly what the D.C. Circuit did. See Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 95.
157 Falkoff & Knowles, supra note 155, at 892.
158 Id. at 890.
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hand, when the U.S. captures and detains a person inside the war zone, the
constitutional grounds for the government’s actions are much stronger because
the individual’s detention is more closely related to prosecution of the war
effort.159 In determining the reasonability of the relationship, the interplay
between the government’s ability to wage war, the length of detention of the
prisoners, and the practical implications of the ruling are all relevant
concerns.160
These nuances, taken together, indicate the true aim of the Boumediene
test is not a formalistic review of each factor. Rather, Boumediene recognizes
government power, regardless of whom it is exercised against, remains con-
strained by the Constitution even in an extraterritorial setting.161 The degree to
which this power is constrained, however, depends on the scope of Congress’s
Suspension Clause power, the process Congress provides as an alternative to
the writ, and the executive’s military mission.162 Therefore, while Justice Ken-
nedy’s three-factor test may be the most practical means of analyzing the
habeas privileges of military detainees, his actual analysis of Guanta´namo
detention did not correspond with the underlying policy concerns motivating
the factor test in the first place. This mismatch between analysis and policy
explains the difficulties the courts faced in analyzing Fadi Al Maqaleh’s claim.
III. BAGRAM: OBAMA’S LEGAL BLACK HOLE
A. The New Guanta´namo
Bagram Airfield, forty miles north of Kabul, Afghanistan, became the
“next front in the battle over the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution”163 in
2006, when Ahmad Al Maqaleh, father of twenty-five-year-old Yemeni citizen
and Bagram detainee Fadi Al Maqaleh, filed a writ of habeas corpus on behalf
of his son with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.164
The airfield had played a central role in the United States’ military conflict
since 2001, when the army took control of the dilapidated former Soviet site
and converted the aircraft machine shop into temporary housing for detain-
ees.165 The “Bagram Collection Point” initially screened “prisoners who would
be detained long-term elsewhere.”166 However, by May 2002, the “Bagram
Theater Internment Facility” became the “primary collection and interrogation
point” for detainees, and by mid-2004, transfers to Guanta´namo Bay declined
while prisoner populations in Bagram, as well as Saraposa Prison in Kandahar,
began to rise.167 Detainees lived in “cage-like cells bathed continuously in
159 Id.
160 Cf. id. at 892.
161 Id. at 867–68.
162 Id. at 886.
163 Id. at 851.
164 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 1–2, Al Maqaleh v. Rumsfeld, 604 F. Supp. 2d
205 (D.D.C. Sep. 28, 2006) (No. 1:06-cv-01669-JDB).
165 Falkoff & Knowles, supra note 155, at 856; see also Golden, supra note 5.
166 Falkoff & Knowles, supra note 155, at 856; see also Golden, supra note 5.
167 Falkoff & Knowles, supra note 155, at 856. Until January 2010, the military refused to
release the identities of prisoners being held at Bagram or the population numbers. Id. at
857. Falkoff and Knowles estimate “the prison population grew from about 300 prisoners in
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white light”168 and “[slept] on the floor on foam mats . . . often using plastic
buckets for latrines”169 until 2009, when the United States opened a new prison
facility on the base.170 The conditions at Bagram gained international attention
in 2005, following the deaths of Dilawar and another prisoner.171 Allegations
of abuse persisted, including “striking shackled detainees, sleep deprivation,
stress positions, prolonged hanging by the arms, beatings, use of dogs to terror-
ize detainees, and sexual abuse.”172
The New York Times caught wind of the abuse stories at Bagram and
reporter Tim Golden published a series of investigative reports on the prison in
early 2005.173 Shortly thereafter, independent filmmaker Alex Gibney traveled
to Afghanistan to interview Dilawar’s family and his interrogators as a part of
his documentary film Taxi to the Dark Side.174 With public scrutiny increasing,
four Bagram prisoners (including Al Maqaleh) filed habeas claims with the
District Court, which merged the cases together and eventually heard oral argu-
ments in response to the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
on January 7, 2009.175
While all four detainees alleged they were captured outside Afghanistan,
the government claimed it captured Fadi al Maqaleh in Zabul, Afghanistan, on
September 10, 2004.176 The CIA captured Haji Wazir, an Afghan citizen, in
early 2004[,] to about 600 prisoners in July 2008,” and to about 645 prisoners in September
2009, when the article was written. Id.
168 Anand Gopal, Afraid of the Dark in Afghanistan, CBSNEWS.COM (Jan. 29, 2010, 5:02
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/01/29/opinion/main6155116.shtml.
169 Tim Golden & Eric Schmitt, A Growing Afghan Prison Rivals Bleak Guanta´namo, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 26, 2006, § 1, at 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/26/interna-
tional/26bagram.html?ref=bagramairbaseafghanistan.
170 Alissa J. Rubin, U.S. Readies New Facility for Afghanistan Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
16, 2009, at A8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/16/world/asia/16bagram.
html?ref=bagramairbaseafghanistan. The facility cost $60 million to build, occupies 40
acres, Falkoff & Knowles, supra note 155, at 857, and can house up to 1,140 prisoners,
Rubin, supra. It “includes classrooms, vocational-technical training areas and fully equipped
medical facilities.” Id.
171 See Golden, supra note 5. Mullah Habibullah died of a blood clot caused by severe
injuries to his legs. Id. His leg injuries stemmed from a barrage of peroneal strikes delivered
over a number of days while Habibullah was tethered to the wire ceiling of his cage “by two
sets of handcuffs and a chain around his waist.” Id. Like Dilawar, the coroner also ruled
Habibullah’s death a homicide. Id.
172 FLETCHER & STOVER, supra note 3, at 32.
173 See Golden, supra note 5. For a listing of articles, see Times Topics: Bagram Detention
Center (Afghanistan), N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/sub-
jects/b/bagram_air_base_afghanistan/index.html (last updated Nov. 16, 2009).
174 TAXI TO THE DARK SIDE, supra note 2. The film won a variety of awards, including the
2007 Academy Award for Best Documentary Feature. Complete List of Academy Award
Nominees and Winners, CNN.COM (Jan. 22, 2008, 15:56), http://www.edition.cnn.com/2008/
SHOWBIZ/Movies/02/24/oscar.complete.list/index.html.
175 Order Inviting Respondent to Refine Position at 2, Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 629 F. Supp. 2d
63 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 2009) (No. 1:06-cv-01697-JDB), available at https://sites.google.com/a/
ijnetwork.org/bagram-public-library/Home/maqaleh.
176 Al Maqeleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 209 (D.D.C. 2009); Decl. of Colonel James
W. Gray at 7, Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. Mar. 3, 2007) (No. 1:06-
cv-01669-JDB); Second Decl. of Colonel James W. Gray, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. Apr.
19, 2007) (No. 1:06-cv-01669-JDB).
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2002 while he was on a business trip to Dubai.177 The CIA captured Yemeni
citizen Amin al Bakri in Thailand in 2002.178 Redha al-Najar, a Tunisian citi-
zen, resided in Karachi, Pakistan, until he disappeared in 2002.179 The govern-
ment did not dispute the sites of capture for Wazir, Al Bakri, or al-Najar.180
B. The District Court Opinion: Reining in the President
Judge John D. Bates, the District Court judge (and Bush appointee)
assigned to the case, sought to determine whether foreign nationals designated
as enemy combatants and held at Bagram could invoke the writ of habeas
corpus in U.S. federal courts.181 Bates first dismissed Boumediene as a facial
rejection of Section 7 of the MCA because the Supreme Court’s analysis in
Boumediene was Guanta´namo-specific.182 Consequently, unless the MCA
abridged the constitutional right to habeas corpus, as protected by the Suspen-
sion Clause, the MCA stripped federal courts of the power to hear Bagram
statutory habeas claims.183 Bates ultimately concluded that the sanctity of
habeas protection outweighed the need for executive deference at Bagram and
denied the government’s motion to dismiss for all of the detainees but
Wazir.184
However, Bates’s analysis applied a different framework than the simple
three-factor test in Boumediene. Instead, Bates used six separate factors: (1) the
citizenship of the detainee; (2) the status of the detainee; (3) the adequacy of
the process used to make the status determination; (4) the site of capture; (5)
the site of detention; and (6) any practical obstacles inherent in allowing the
detainee access to the writ.185 Bates also mentioned a seventh factor implied by
the Court in Boumediene: “the length of the prisoner’s detention without ade-
quate review.”186 Although this approach was more complicated than the
Court’s approach in Boumediene, the factors Bates used actually resulted in a
more thorough analysis of the United States’ de facto control at Bagram by
carefully considering the interplay between the government’s ability to wage
war, the length of detention of the prisoners, and the practical implications of
the ruling.
In the case of the Bagram detainees, their citizenship, status, and site of
capture factors were all the same as the Guanta´namo detainees, although Bates
pointed out that Boumediene set forth these factors without analyzing them in
177 Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 209.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 230.
181 Id. at 207.
182 Id. at 214.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 235–36.
185 Id. at 215. One author referred to the breakdown as “a helpful distillation of
Boumediene’s functional model.” Justin D. D’Aloia, Note, From Baghdad to Bagram: The
Length & Strength of the Suspension Clause After Boumediene, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 957,
1014 (2010). Another author, however, referred to Bates’s application of the test as “poorly-
reasoned [and] poorly-explained.” James Thornburg, Comment, Balancing Act in Black
Robes: Extraterritorial Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction Beyond Boumediene, 48 DUQ. L. REV.
85, 103 (2010).
186 Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 216.
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any depth, nor were they particularly determinative, so it is difficult to accord
them any amount of weight.187 However, in the Bagram context, the interplay
between the site of capture and the site of detention factors was different
because detainees were shuttled to Bagram, into a theater of war with which
they had no previous connection.188 Bates paid particular attention to this fact,
as he explained:
It is one thing to detain those captured on the surrounding battlefield at a place like
Bagram, which respondents correctly maintain is in a theater of war. It is quite
another thing to apprehend people in foreign countries—far from any Afghan battle-
field—and then bring them to a theater of war, where the Constitution arguably may
not reach.189
Therefore, Bates accorded more weight to the sites of the detainees’ appre-
hension than the Court gave the petitioners in Boumediene or the D.C. Circuit
accorded the Bagram detainees.190
The site of detention, Bagram Internment Facility, required Bates to place
Bagram on what he called the “Guanta´namo-Landsberg spectrum” of objective
control by the United States for the purposes of determining de facto sover-
eignty, since Bagram was not located within the official territory (de jure sover-
eignty) of the United States.191 While the United States had so much control
over Guanta´namo Bay for an indefinite period of time that the Supreme Court
concluded it was “not abroad” for habeas purposes in Boumediene, the United
States only shared control with Allied forces at Landsberg for a short period of
time in Eisentrager.192 Bagram fell somewhere between these extremes—
while the United States shared some amount of legal (de jure) jurisdiction with
Afghanistan, it retained a high degree of objective control.193 Although Bagram
did not parallel either Guanta´namo or Landsberg perfectly, Bates could not
conclude that Bagram, like Guanta´namo, was “not abroad.”194 However,
Bagram was still more similar to Guanta´namo than Landsberg because the
United States expressed a high degree of objective control there, which would
cut in favor of invoking the Suspension Clause for the detainees.195
187 See id. at 218, 231. Boumediene reasoned that “[t]he Executive is entitled to a reasona-
ble period of time to determine a detainee’s status before a court entertains that detainee’s
habeas corpus petition” but the Guanta´namo cases “do not involve detainees who have been
held for a short period of time.” Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 794–95 (2008).
188 Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 220. Essentially, the United States took war on terror
detainees and transferred them to a holding area for the U.S.-Afghanistan war. This shift
further complicates the legal framework because it forces courts to consider subjects of a
state/non-state actor conflict under the detention laws of a state/state conflict, revealing just
how convoluted the administration’s policy is. For discussion, see infra Section V.
189 Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 220. These separation of powers concerns about limiting
executive discretion might be another factor in the Boumediene analysis, as the three factors
were not exhaustive. See Baher Azmy, Executive Detention, Boumediene, and the New
Common Law of Habeas, 95 IOWA L. REV. 445, 494–95 (2010).
190 Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 221.
191 Id. at 221–22.
192 Id. at 221, 225.
193 Id. at 223.
194 Id. at 225.
195 Id. at 224. U.S. officials at Bagram are not answerable to the Afghan government for
acts committed on the base, even for torture or prisoner abuse. Azmy, supra note 189, at
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Bates concluded under the fourth factor, the adequacy of process, that the
Bagram detainees received far less due process than petitioners in either Eisen-
trager or Boumediene.196 In Eisentrager, the military charged the prisoners by
a bill of particulars with detailed factual allegations against them, afforded pris-
oners counsel to rebut those allegations, and allowed them to introduce evi-
dence and cross-examine the prosecution’s witnesses.197 The Boumediene
petitioners’ CSRTs lacked due process, but the procedures there were more
protective than those afforded to the Bagram prisoners.198 The Unlawful
Enemy Combatant Review Board (“UECRB”) governed the status determina-
tions at Bagram; after soldiers made an initial field determination, the UECRB
reviewed the detainee’s status seventy-five days later and reevaluated the deter-
mination every six months “with all relevant information reasonably availa-
ble.”199 Detainees could make written statements for the UECRB to read before
it sent a majority vote to the commanding general.200 The process offered no
appeal, and Bates found it to be “less sophisticated and more error-prone” than
the Guanta´namo CSRTs, especially considering the detainees’ self-representa-
tion, linguistic and cultural barriers, and limited access to evidence.201 There-
fore, the adequacy of process factor more strongly favored extending the
Suspension Clause to cover Bagram detainees than it did the Guanta´namo
detainees in Boumediene.202
The part of Bates’s opinion the D.C. Circuit took most offense with on
appeal was the analysis of the sixth factor: the practical obstacles of extending
the writ to the petitioners. Bates reasoned that even though Bagram was in an
active theater of war and subject to occasional attacks from the enemy (similar
494. Under the terms of the lease, the Afghan government may only have “concurrent juris-
diction over Afghans who commit crimes on the Airfield.” Id.
196 Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 226–27. The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) gov-
erns the Bagram lease. See generally Agreement Regarding the Status of United States Mili-
tary and Civilian Personnel of the U.S. Department of Defense Present in Afghanistan in
Connection with Cooperative Efforts in Response to Terrorism, Humanitarian and Civic
Assistance, Military Training and Exercises, and Other Activities, U.S.-Afg., May 28, 2003,
State Dep’t No. 03-67, 2003 WL 21754316.
197 Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 226.
198 Id. at 226–27. For details on the CSRT, see supra notes 103–08 and accompanying text.
199 Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 227.
200 Id.
201 Id. In an interview with Salon.com, a representative of Human Rights First (an interna-
tional watchdog group) described the UECRB hearings as follows:
The hearings sound good on paper but then when you actually attend them—I hate to use the
cliche´—it’s Kafkaesque. They’re not allowed to see much of the evidence against them because
it’s classified. So a military person will stand up and read the charges—say that the detainee was
found to be an IED maker. And the accused will say, ‘Well what is the evidence against me?’
And the military won’t produce it because it’s classified. . . . [The personal representative is] a
field-grade soldier who is assigned to represent a detainee—but they have no legal training
beyond a 35-hour course. Many former detainees told me they did not trust their representatives,
who are uniformed soldiers. And at least in the public sessions, we did not see the representatives
ever challenge evidence.
Justin Elliott, The Gitmo No One Talks About, SALON.COM (Jun. 4, 2011, 8:01 AM), http://
www.salon.com/2011/06/04/bagram_obama_gitmo/.
202 Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 227.
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concerns the Supreme Court accorded weight to in Eisentrager),203 real-time
videoconferencing provided a workable alternative to an in-court appearance
that would require physical transfer out of the secure zone.204 Furthermore, the
burden of detainee litigation would fall on lawyers and administrative person-
nel, not on soldiers who would otherwise be pulled from the battlefield.205
Therefore, while Bagram’s location in an active theater of war posed more
practical difficulties than the situation at Guanta´namo, the complications did
not rise to a level that precluded the application of the Suspension Clause.206
However, Bates found insurmountable practical difficulties in terms of
potential friction with the host Afghan government over Afghan citizens in
U.S. custody at Bagram.207 At the time, the U.S. military was trying to transfer
custody of its Bagram prisoners to Afghan officials and Bates speculated U.S.
courts would probably come to different conclusions in habeas proceedings
than Afghan courts because the two systems used different legal standards.208
Furthermore, if some prisoners were released, their destinations would be
Afghanistan.209 Such a unilateral decision on the United States’ part could
upset the “delicate diplomatic balance” between the United States and Afghani-
stan by refusing Afghanistan courts jurisdiction and control over their own citi-
zens.210 These particular concerns, however, only applied to the Afghan
detainee, Wazir.211 Therefore, Bates found non-Afghan citizens could invoke
the Suspension Clause, which made Section 7 of the MCA unconstitutional as
applied to them because no adequate alternative existed.212 Bates expressly
limited his holding to the three specific detainees at Bagram—Al Maqaleh, Al
Bakri, and Al Jaujar—in order to preserve the concept that the U.S. Constitu-
203
“[I]n Eisentrager, the Allied Forces administering Landsberg Prison were threatened by
‘enemy elements, guerilla fighters, and ‘werewolves.’’” Id. at 228 (citing Boumediene v.
Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 769 (2008)); see supra note 149 and accompanying text.
204 Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 228. Following recommendations by the ICRC, the
Pentagon is already considering using videoconferencing to allow families of Guanta´namo
detainees to communicate with prisoners at the base. See Peter Finn & Julie Tate, Guanta´-
namo Bay Detainees’ Family Members May Be Allowed to Visit, WASH. POST (May 11,
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-13382294. The Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice already allows for videoconferencing in limited circumstances. See Exec. Order
No. 13430, 72 Fed. Reg. 20,213, 20,213–14 (Apr. 18, 2007).
205 Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 228–29. This alleged practical concern was especially
irrelevant to Bates because the detainees had been captured outside the active theater of war,
which meant the personnel involved in their capture were highly unlikely to be engaged in
battlefield activities in Afghanistan six years later. See id.
206 Id. at 229.
207 Id. at 229–30. In late February 2009, at least 20 of the approximately 650 detainees in
Bagram were not Afghans. See Karen DeYoung & Del Quentin Wilber, Britain Acknowl-
edges 2 Detainees Are in U.S. Prison in Afghanistan, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2009, at A4. No
such friction existed at Guanta´namo because no Cuban court had jurisdiction over any of the
detainees. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 751.
208 Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d. at 229.
209 Id. at 229–30.
210 Id. at 230.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 232, 235.
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tion does not reach to the “four corners of the earth.”213 Thus, all petitioners
except Wazir were entitled to habeas review in U.S. federal court.214
IV. INTER ARMA, SILENT LEGES215—BATES REBUKED
Even in light of a reasonable and well-supported opinion by Bates, the
D.C. Circuit overruled the District Court on May 21, 2010.216 Rather than
beginning its inquiry with Boumediene, the opinion, penned by Judge David B.
Sentelle (a Reagan appointee), framed the Suspension Clause analysis by
devoting a large portion of the preliminary inquiry to the district and Supreme
Court opinions in Eisentrager and the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Rasul, all of
which emphasized the unavailability of habeas rights to enemy detainees during
times of military conflict.217 However, dicta like habeas “cannot be ‘made
available to aliens abroad when basic constitutional protections are not’”218
was not the controlling standard.219 Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit repeatedly
emphasized the Rasul decision did not overrule Eisentrager, and Eisentrager
therefore remained binding precedent, even though the statutory basis for the
case had largely been rebuked by Braden v. 30th Judicial Court of Kentucky.220
In Boumediene, the D.C. Circuit had insisted that Eisentrager held “constitu-
tional habeas rights did not extend to any aliens who had never been in or
brought into the sovereign territory of the United States” only to be rebuked by
the Supreme Court again.221 According to the D.C. Circuit, Boumediene
213 See id. at 231. While Bates’ concern about the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution
addressed some of the government concerns, Boumediene repeatedly emphasized “even
when the United States acts outside its borders, its powers are not ‘absolute and unlimited’
but are subject to such ‘restrictions as are expressed in the Constitution.’” 553 U.S. 723, 765
(2008). Therefore, while courts continue to use dicta that the Constitution does not extend
across the globe, Boumediene recognizes it does, at least to the degree that the United States’
de facto or de jure power operates around the globe.
214 Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 235.
215 Cicero’s famous saying, roughly translated, means “During War, Law is Silent.” See
ANTHONY EVERITT, CICERO: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF ROME’S GREATEST POLITICIAN 96–99
(2003).
216 Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
217 See id. at 87–91.
218 Id. at 90 (quoting Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1411 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
219 This is not the first time the D.C. Circuit has held fast to its own interpretation of the
Constitution despite Supreme Court language to the contrary. See Daniel Michael, The Mili-
tary Commissions Act of 2006, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 473, 482–85 (2007).
Although the D.C. Circuit felt free to dismiss without explanation these determinations as dicta,
it later relied on Supreme Court dictum because ‘firm and considered dicta . . . binds this court.’
The D.C. Circuit gave no explanation for why it considered the exhaustive analysis and unquali-
fied findings in Rasul less ‘firm and considered’ than the dicta later respected by the court.
Id. at 483 (footnotes omitted).
220 Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 90; Braden v. 30th Judicial Dist. Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S.
484, 495 (1973) (finding the language of the federal habeas statute “requires nothing more
than the court issuing the writ to have jurisdiction over the custodian” of the prisoner, not the
prisoner himself). But see Justice Scalia’s dissent in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 488–89
(2004): “The Court’s contention that Eisentrager was somehow negated by Braden—a deci-
sion that dealt with a different issue and did not so much as mention Eisentrager—is
implausible in the extreme.” (citations omitted).
221 Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 92.
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“explored the breadth of the Court’s holding in Eisentrager (still not over-
ruled)” rather than providing for a modern approach to accessing habeas rights
extraterritorially.222 The D.C. Circuit’s logic again highlights the problems
with relying on World War II precedent in a twenty-first century world. While
the World War II cases “provide limited, superficial support for the Adminis-
tration’s position[,] [u]ltimately, however, it is the differences that count. The
Bush Administration’s claim of executive detention power eclipses anything
that has come before it and distorts these cases beyond recognition.”223
The D.C. Circuit’s subtle, yet continual emphasis on Eisentrager fore-
shadowed its ultimate conclusion that the Bagram detainees did not have access
to federal courts. The D.C. Circuit formally stuck with the familiar three-factor
Boumediene analysis rather than adopting Bates’s six to seven factor
inquiry.224 The D.C. Circuit’s analysis of the first Boumediene factor paralleled
Bates’s, concluding the petitioners “differ in no material respect from the peti-
tioners at Guanta´namo who prevailed in Boumediene”225 in terms of citizen-
ship and status and were “in a stronger position for the availability of the writ
than were either the Eisentrager or Boumediene petitioners” because the
UECRBs offered less due process than even the CSRT.226
On the other hand, the D.C. Circuit found the second factor, “‘the nature
of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place,’ weigh[ed] heav-
ily in favor of the United States.”227 Rather than recognizing, as Bates did, that
all three remaining petitioners claimed to be captured outside the field of battle
(and were subjects of the borderless war on terror, not the geographically-
defined U.S.-Afghanistan war), the D.C. Circuit simply stated that “[l]ike all
petitioners in both Eisentrager and Boumediene, the petitioners here were
apprehended abroad.”228 However, the Al Maqaleh petitioners were not appre-
hended in a theater of war, as were the petitioners in Eisentrager (China) and
some of the petitioners in Boumediene (Afghanistan).229 Instead, the D.C. Cir-
cuit focused solely on how the United States lacked the same degree of legal
sovereignty over Bagram as it maintained at Guanta´namo, rather than looking
at de facto elements, as Bates did.230
Rather than placing Bagram on a spectrum of control between Guanta´-
namo and Landsberg, the D.C. Circuit instead approached the question as an
“either/or” analysis—either Bagram was like Guanta´namo, or it was like
Landsberg. As the United States expressed “no indication of any intent to
occupy the base . . . permanent[ly],” Bagram fell into the Landsberg cate-
gory.231 The D.C. Circuit’s analysis of the sites of detention and apprehension
factor highlights the benefits of using a six to seven factor test versus the
Supreme Court’s three-factor approach, which is difficult to balance given the
222 Id.
223 Hafetz, supra note 38, at 366.
224 Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 94.
225 Id. at 96.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 220 (D.D.C. 2009).
230 Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 97.
231 Id.
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unclear weights of each factor. Bates was able to distinguish the sites of appre-
hension and detention from Boumediene and Eisentrager by looking at the his-
torical context of each site, which weighed in the Al Maqaleh petitioners’
favor, and concluded the site of detention was neither like Guanta´namo nor
Landsberg. This tipped the scale slightly in favor of the petitioners. The D.C.
Circuit, on the other hand, was able to ignore the issue of the apprehension sites
by completely focusing on a cursory analysis of the site of detention, which it
concluded weighed in the United States’ favor, and then qualify its decision by
citing to Boumediene’s limited dicta regarding the theater of war.232
Thus, the D.C. Circuit’s broad brushstrokes in its analysis of the second
factor characterized the prisoners’ detention site within the theater of war sub-
ject to a more cooperative leasing agreement with the host government as dis-
positive. This reasoning stands in juxtaposition with the D.C. Circuit’s narrow
application of Boumediene as extending only to Guanta´namo, rather than
applying the case to prison sites with similar functions, but which lack the
unique leasing characteristics of the naval base (like Bagram). Ultimately, the
outcome in Al Maqaleh reveals the practical flaw in the Supreme Court’s
Boumediene test: Are the factors within each factor supposed to be evaluated
with equal weight? If they are not, what is the point of including them in the
first place, other than sheer lip service? For some courts, the test may lack
clarity, resulting in constructions like Bates’s six-to-seven factor approach,
which attempt to deconstruct the test in order to sharpen the analysis. On the
other hand, some courts, like the D.C. Circuit, might find the three factors flexi-
ble enough to determine the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution’s protec-
tions. However, one thing is for sure: as applied by the D.C. Circuit, the
Boumediene test fails to reach consistent outcomes in the face of extremely
similar detention conditions at both Guanta´namo and Bagram. Unfortunately,
more litigation will be necessary to determine the true workability of the
Supreme Court’s framework.
The D.C. Circuit’s analysis of the third factor—“the practical obstacles
inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ”233—reveals the true
divergence in the two Al Maqaleh opinions. The analysis begins with the pro-
position that “Bagram, indeed the entire nation of Afghanistan, remains a thea-
ter of war. Not only does this suggest that the detention at Bagram is more like
the detention at Landsberg than Guantanamo [sic], the position of the United
States is even stronger in this case than it was in Eisentrager.”234
The D.C. Circuit goes on to recite Kennedy’s language in Boumediene
that speculated if the United States was answerable to another sovereign for its
acts on the Guanta´namo Base, “or if the detention facility were located in an
active theater of war, arguments that issuing the writ would be ‘impractical or
232 See id. at 97-98. (The Supreme Court expressly stated in Boumediene that at Guanta-
namo, “[w]hile obligated to abide by the terms of the lease, the United States is, for all
practical purposes, answerable to no other sovereign for its acts on the base. Were that not
the case, or if the detention facility were located in an active theater of war, arguments that
issuing the writ would be ‘impractical or anomalous’ would have more weight.” (internal
citations omitted)).
233 Id. at 97.
234 Id.
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anomalous’ would have more weight” and the Suspension Clause would be less
likely to operate.235 However, rather than simply affording the theater of war
status of Bagram more weight, the D.C. Circuit made this fact determinative.236
It held “under both Eisentrager and Boumediene, the writ does not extend to
the Bagram confinement in an active theater of war in a territory under neither
the de facto nor de jure sovereignty of the United States and within the territory
of another de jure sovereign.”237 Quoting Eisentrager’s language about trials
“hamper[ing] the war effort” and “bring[ing] aid and comfort to the enemy” by
“allow[ing] the very enemies [a field commander] is ordered to reduce to sub-
mission to call him to account in his own civil courts and divert his efforts and
attention from the military offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home,”238
the D.C. Circuit seemed to be adhering to a mindset so many legal scholars
have warned against: inter arma, silent leges (in war, law is silent).239
The D.C. Circuit’s misplaced reliance on Eisentrager highlights the
problems of analogizing to military case law from the 1950s in the twenty-first
century. The biggest difference between the two eras is that Congress had rec-
ognized and approved of the executive’s practical concerns in Eisentrager by
issuing a declaration of war in World War II.240 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court was only able to engage in dicta about keeping military men out of the
courtroom because the Eisentrager petitioners had already obtained due pro-
cess—trial and conviction by a military commission satisfying basic require-
ments of Geneva.241 However, the situation at Landsberg is not analogous to
the current conflict in Afghanistan. Congress has not declared war. The United
States is not fighting another state in the war on terror. Despite the practical
challenges of declaring war against a non-state actor or a failed state, Congress
has done little since the 2001 AUMF to oversee the president’s use of his com-
mander-in-chief powers, even in the face of news story after news story about
prisoner abuse.242 In light of these international humanitarian failures, perhaps
a reconsideration of the declaration of war is necessary.243
Furthermore, the Bush (and now Obama) administration went out of its
way to avoid the requirements of Geneva,244 a fact the D.C. Circuit recognized
when it agreed both the CSRT and UECRB fail to satisfy basic due process.245
235 Id. at 97–98 (emphasis omitted) (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 770 (2008)).
236 See id.
237 Id.
238 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 779 (1950).
239 See REHNQUIST, supra note 51, at 218–25.
240 S.J. Res. 116, 77th Cong. (1941).
241 See Hafetz, supra note 38, at 370, 372–73.
242 See Golden, supra note 5; Neil Lewis & Douglas Jehl, Files Show New Abuse Cases in
Afghan and Iraqi Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2005, at A11 available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2005/02/18/politics/18abuse.html; Mark Mazzetti, Report Provides New
Details on C.I.A. Prison Abuses, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2009, at A4, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/08/23/us/politics/23cia.html; Thom Shanker & Jacques Steinberg,
The Struggle For Iraq: Captives; Bush Voices ‘Disgust’ at Abuse of Iraqi Prisoners, N.Y.
TIMES, May 1, 2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/01/world/the-struggle-
for-iraq-captives-bush-voices-disgust-at-abuse-of-iraqi-prisoners.html.
243 Infra Part V.
244 See Corn, What Law Applies, supra note 14, at 4–9.
245 Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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While the petitioners in Eisentrager were seeking another forum for their
claims to be heard, the Al Maqaleh petitioners were seeking any way to escape
legal limbo. Therefore, by relying on Eisentrager’s practical concerns as
opposed to Boumediene’s more applicable and current analogies, the D.C. Cir-
cuit came to a conclusion unsupported by common law or common sense.
Without specific allegations by the government of prohibitive cost or impossi-
ble allocation of military resources, the administration’s practical concerns
were just as unfounded as the prisoners’ concerns about being transported into
a theater of war and cut off from the reach of U.S. courts.246 The blanket claim
of “war” cannot constitute a determinative factor, even under Boumediene’s
dicta about a theater of war.
Finally, the D.C. Circuit addressed Bates’s concerns about shuttling pris-
oners from outside the combat zone into Bagram in order to refuse them the
protections of the Constitution. The D.C. Circuit thought the idea was ludicrous
because it “remains only a possibility; its resolution can await a case in which
the claim is a reality rather than a speculation.”247 The D.C. Circuit thought the
idea that “the United States deliberately confined the detainees in [a] theater of
war rather than at . . . Guanta´namo, is not only unsupported by evidence, it is
not supported by reason.”248 The court erred when it ignored allegations of the
rather well-known practice, known as “extraordinary rendition,” of capturing
terror suspects abroad and then placing them in strategically chosen locations
(such as Guanta´namo249 or countries that condone torture) to either avoid the
reaches of federal courts or to avoid international legal ramifications.250 By
ignoring this policy concern for want of objective facts of a nefarious plan,
which would be difficult for the prisoners to obtain without further discovery,
the D.C. Circuit overlooked the important separation of powers analysis central
to Bates’s opinion as well as the Boumediene decision and sent its analysis
down a slippery slope.251
Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit supported the government’s paradoxical
argument that the practical concerns of housing detainees in a theater of war—a
problem the executive created by moving detainees there in the first place—
outweighed the detainees’ due process rights.252 If the D.C. Circuit was looking
for objective facts to support the prisoners’ contentions, it need only have
looked to the population statistics at Guanta´namo and Bagram. As Guanta´namo
litigation increased, its prisoner population began to decrease while, at the same
246 As of February 15, 2011, the Al Maqaleh detainees filed with the D.C. District Court
again, requesting amendment of the habeas petitions in light of new evidence bearing on
their claims of the executive’s design to transport them into a theater of war in order to deny
them access to federal courts. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, No. 06-1669, 2011 WL 666883, at *1–2
(D.D.C. Feb. 15, 2011). Judge Bates denied the government’s motion to dismiss, and the
claim is still pending as of this publication. Id.
247 Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 98.
248 Id. at 99.
249 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
250 See Editorial, Malign Neglect, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2011, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/05/22/opinion/22sun1.html.
251 See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
252 Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 97.
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time, the population at Bagram increased.253 The correlation cannot be acciden-
tal and requiring prisoners to present evidence of a concerted effort by the
executive to circumvent international and domestic law is unrealistic and sets
the bar too high for detainees who lack the opportunity for discovery.
The D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Al Maqaleh v. Gates ultimately demon-
strates the sort of convoluted logic governing the prosecution of military con-
flicts in the twenty-first century. Although the president balks at the idea of
officially recognizing the conflict in Afghanistan as a “war,” which would
invoke the humanitarian obligations of Geneva, he is more than willing to hide
behind the “But it’s War!” excuse when called into court to justify withholding
fundamental protections. Unfortunately, as President Obama attempts to close
Guanta´namo, the implications of Al Maqaleh will become all the more clear
when Bagram becomes the primary storage facility for detainees in the war on
terror, even though the detainees have no legal status to challenge their confine-
ment there.
V. THE WAR THAT ISN’T: AFGHANISTAN, THE WAR ON TERROR,
AND GENEVA
By endorsing the government’s paradoxical reasoning in Al Maqaleh, the
D.C. Circuit took a dangerous step towards reorienting the legal and moral
compasses for the United States’ involvement in current and future interna-
tional armed conflicts. The D.C. Circuit should have affirmed the District
Court’s decision to allow three of the Al Maqaleh petitioners access to habeas
rights not only under the Suspension Clause analysis, but also to support the
United States’ international humanitarian obligations.
Two sources of international humanitarian law254 bind the United States:
formal treaties, like the Geneva and Hague Conventions, as well as customary
law, or jus cogens.255 By abiding by these sources of law in the past, the U.S.
253 See Falkoff & Knowles, supra note 155, at 857 (discussing changing populations at
Guanta´namo and Bagram); see also Azmy, supra note 189 at 495 (“The Bagram prison
population has been growing steadily, ever since the Court’s decision in Rasul effectively
stopped the transfer of prisoners to Guantanamo.”).
254 This Note uses “international humanitarian law” for the sake of clarity, but the principals
discussed are also applicable to the “law of armed conflict” (a term used by the Geneva
Conventions) as well, which also has origins in treaty-based and customary law. Interna-
tional humanitarian law seeks “to limit the violence [in] armed conflicts by protecting those
taking no active part in hostilities, by protecting property not considered [a part of] military
objectives, and by . . . restricting the . . . methods of warfare [parties can use].” GARY D.
SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 23
(2010). It also distinguishes between international armed conflict (to which the four Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocol I apply) and non-international armed conflict (to which
a more limited range of protections applies, particularly Common Article 3 and Additional
Protocol I). Id. The law of armed conflict (formerly the “laws of war”), on the other hand,
addresses the specifics of jus in bello and jus ad bellum, the conditions and means by which
nations may go to war. Id. at 22.
255 The Army Field Manual recognizes, “the law of war is derived from two principal
sources: . . . Treaties (or Conventions), such as the Hague and Geneva Conventions [and] . . .
Custom. . . . [T]his body of unwritten or customary law is firmly established by the custom
of nations and well defined by recognized authorities on international law.” DEP’T OF THE
ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 4 (1956). International custom
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recognized international human rights during wartime and peace not only as a
signatory of major treaties, but also because such “civilized” behavior is consis-
tent with American values.256 For example, far before treaties bound the U.S.
to recognize respect for human dignity and an aversion to suffering on prison-
ers’ behalf in war, George Washington ordered Hessian (German mercenary)
captives to be treated “with the same rights of humanity for which Americans
were striving.”257 After the Battle of Princeton, Washington ordered his
officers to care for 221 British prisoners and “[t]reat them with humanity, and
Let them have no reason to Complain of our Copying the brutal example of the
British army.”258 Therefore, from the founding of the nation, military leaders
have aspired to fight war in a way consummate with American values, be it
pursuant to a treaty obligation or not.259
However, given the paradigm shift away from classifying combatants as if
they were prisoners of war regardless of whether they met the Geneva criteria,
the specific type of combat U.S. troops were experiencing in the Middle East
suddenly became important because it dictated how the U.S. would treat pris-
oners.260 The United States’ multifaceted military mission in the Middle East
complicates the legal detention analysis of alleged combatants in Bagram.
Three different military missions are underway in the area: the removal of the
Taliban in Afghanistan,261 the insurgency battle in Iraq,262 and the more global
war on terror.263 The rules of conduct binding the United States depend largely
on which conflict Bagram detainees are involved in; if it is the removal of the
Taliban in Afghanistan, the more traditional rules of state-on-state warfare
probably apply.264 On the other hand, if detainees are incarcerated as a part of
is evidence of a general practice that is extensive and virtually uniform, coupled with the
subjective belief by states that such behavior is required by law. See Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060.
256 See 152 CONG. REC. H7522-61, H7540 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (Statement of Rep.
Steve Israel). During the House Floor Debate on Military Commissions Act, H.R. 6166,
Israel stated, “If I am asking young men and women to die for what we stand for, I want to
stand for something. If I am asking people to fight to kill terrorists, I want to be in the pursuit
of our values, not the terrorist’s values.” Id.
257 DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, WASHINGTON’S CROSSING 378 (2004).
258 Id. at 379 (emphasis in original).
259 Id. at 375 (“In 1776, American leaders believed that it was not enough to win the war.
They also had to win in a way that was consistent with the values of their society and the
principles of their cause.”); see also Patterson, supra note 66, at 2.
260 See Corn, Introduction, supra note 53, at xv.
261 See 2001 AUMF, supra note 70.
262 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-243, 116 Stat. 1498. Though the war in Iraq has officially ended, roughly 4,000 United
States troops remain stationed there. Thom Shanker et al., In Baghdad, Panetta Leads
Uneasy Moment of Closure, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2011, at A19, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/12/16/world/middleeast/panetta-in-baghdad-for-iraq-military-
handover-ceremony.html.
263 Bush, supra note 11.
264 Despite Alberto Gonzales’ insistence that the laws of war did not apply to conflict with
the Taliban because Afghanistan was a failed state and the United States did not recognize it
as a legitimate government, Colin Powell recommended the Geneva Conventions did in fact
apply to the armed conflict with the Taliban, a position the White House eventually adopted.
See Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Attorney Gen., to the President, Decision
re: Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda
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prosecuting the war on terror, the rules are less clear.265 Congress authorized
use of military force against al Qaeda operatives and those who provide support
to the organization, but the authorization falls short of a declaration of war.266
Declarations of war are strong evidence of a state of war and allow armed
force to be applied consistent with the laws of war, including international
humanitarian obligations.267 For nearly two centuries in America, traditional
“war” was limited to situations where Congress passed an official declaration
of war, pursuant to its Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 powers.268 While congres-
sional declarations are strong evidence of a state of war, modern theories of
warfare focus more on the existence of armed hostilities because states are sim-
ply less likely to declare war than in the past.269 Congress has not issued a
declaration of war since 1941, after the bombing of Pearl Harbor.270 Thus, over
the last 50 years, courts have struggled to determine if a state of war actually
exists without a congressional declaration and, if it does, which humanitarian
obligations apply.271 In cases involving insurance or imposition of fines, courts
and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), available at www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents/
20020125.pdf; Memorandum from Colin L. Powell, U.S. Sec’y. of State, to Alberto R. Gon-
zales, U.S. Attorney General, Draft Decision Memorandum for the President on the Applica-
bility of the Geneva Convention to the Conflict in Afghanistan (Jan. 26, 2002) available at
www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents/20020126.pdf; Fact Sheet: The Status of Detainees
at Guantanamo, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Feb. 7, 2002), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/index.php?pid=79402.
265 When Michael Ratner was president of the Center for Constitutional Rights (the group
litigating many of the Guanta´namo Bay habeas cases), Ratner said the Bush administration
used the 2001 AUMF to turn the hunt for those responsible for 9/11 into a war, even though
it was not a war between nation states or a civil war, which would result in the applicability
of the Geneva Conventions. RATNER & RAY, supra note 49, at 17–18. Rather, “[i]t is still an
international law enforcement action to which normal criminal law applies.” Id.
266 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War
on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2066–70 (2005) (discussing the differences between
traditional subjects of military authorization and al Qaeda).
267 C.f. Jinks & Sloss, supra note 50, at 101–04. However, the applicability of the laws of
war no longer requires a declaration of war, as the threshold for imposing the Geneva Con-
ventions on forces is merely “armed conflict.” Id. at 108–09.
268 See Paul W. Kahn, War Powers and the Millennium, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 11, 16–17
(2000) (“Since the advent of the United Nations (UN) Charter, war has been abolished as a
category of international law. A declaration of war serves no purpose under international
law; it can have no bearing on the underlying legal situation.”); see also Michael D. Ramsey,
Presidential Declarations of War, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 321, 322 (2003). But see Bradley
& Goldsmith, supra note 266, at 2058–59 (arguing the formal declaration of war had fallen
out of favor by the Founders’ time).
269 DETTER, supra note 59, at 12. Detter identifies Article 12 of the Covenant of the League
of Nations and Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928, both of which made war illegal, as the source
of the modern tendency to commence war without an official declaration. Id.; see also J.
Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27, 49 (1991) (suggesting Congress’s reluc-
tance to declare war stems from Cold War fears that such declarations against Communist
adversaries would escalate tension between the United States and the Soviet Union, eventu-
ally placing the two in direct military conflict). Without an official declaration of war, both
sides could retreat more easily from the danger of nuclear confrontation without one side
“losing,” as they did in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Id.
270 S.J. Res. 116, 77th Cong. (1941).
271 See Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (declining to determine if the
president’s military actions in Indo-China required a declaration of war by Congress); Del-
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tended to limit the definition of “war” to conflicts stemming from a congres-
sional declaration of war.272 However, in cases of military discipline, the term
“war” included de facto war and did not require a formal declaration.273
As declarations of war fell out of favor, the international community
sought to create a framework to trigger humanitarian law without traditional
legislative recognitions of military action, which previously were required to
invoke such obligations.274 Before the 1990s, some legal scholars attempted to
fill the gap between “war” and “peace” by using the term “armed conflict” to
denote something less than war, assuming war implied a more intense or full-
scale situation.275 Another approach was to treat these armed conflicts as wars
for the purpose of binding the parties to international humanitarian law.276 At
this point, however, the international consensus is that obligations under trea-
ties like the Geneva Conventions operate in two cases: during interstate (Com-
mon Article 2) armed conflict and intrastate armed conflict (Common Article
3).277 Armed conflict exists subject to four conditions: (1) a contention, (2)
between at least two nation-states, (3), wherein armed force is employed; with
(4) intent to overwhelm.278
The battle between the Taliban and Northern Alliance troops was an intra-
state conflict until the United States intervened in 2001, at which point the
lums v. Bush, 752 F.Supp. 1141, 1148 (D.D.C. 1990) (declining to determine if the presi-
dent’s military actions in the First Gulf War required a declaration of war by Congress).
272 See Robb v. United States, 456 F.2d 768, 770–71 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (military courts did not
have jurisdiction over a civilian employee of the U.S. Navy because he was not “in time of
war” when he violated a military command during his engagement in Vietnam); Hammond
v. Nat’l Life & Accident Ins. Co., 243 So.2d 902, 904 (La. Ct. App. 1971) (decedent was not
in service “in time of war” when he was killed aboard an aircraft carrier in the Gulf of
Tonkin); Jackson v. N. Am. Assurance Soc’y, Inc., 183 S.E.2d 160, 160–61 (Va. 1971) (for
the purposes of a life insurance policy that excluded benefits for death “by war or act of
war,” decedent was not “in service in time of war” when he was killed in Vietnam).
273 See Broussard v. Patton, 466 F.2d 816, 819 (9th Cir. 1972) (airman’s desertion in the
Gulf of Tonkin occurred “in time of war”); United States v. Shell, 23 C.M.R. 110, 114
(C.M.A. 1957) (soldier’s desertion from Alabama military base was “in time of war” due to
the United States’ engagement in Korea); United States v. Bancroft, 11 C.M.R. 3, 4 (C.M.A.
1953) (charge against soldier stationed in Korea of “sleeping on post” was “in time of war”).
274 See Corn, What Law Applies, supra note 14, at 74; DETTER, supra note 59, at 12.
275 DETTER, supra note 59, at 19–20. For example, the bombing of Berlin, Dresden, and
Tokyo in World War II were full-scale acts of war, with the aim of killing large scores of
combatants (and arguably civilians) while targeting essential war-making infrastructure, like
munitions plants, as well as destroying the enemy’s morale. See Chris af Jochnick & Roger
Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War, 35 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 49, 86–89 (1994).
276 The Geneva Conventions of 1949 changed the international vocabulary of military
conflict
by making clear that their jus in bello rules applied not only to ‘cases of declared war’ but also
more broadly to ‘any other armed conflict’ between states, regardless of whether a ‘state of war’
was recognized by one of the parties. Today, ‘armed conflict’—not ‘war’—is the relevant juris-
dictional concept for jus in bello. As a result, it now appears that declarations of war serve little
purpose under international law.
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 266, at 2061 (footnotes omitted).
277 Corn, Introduction, supra note 53, at xiii.
278 DEREK GRIMES ET AL., INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, LAW OF
WAR HANDBOOK 4 (Keith E. Puls ed., 2005).
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conflict became interstate.279 The Geneva Conventions’ protections were cer-
tainly applicable in the latter case, as both Afghanistan and the United States
were signatories of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.280 At the time of the
U.S. invasion, the Taliban regime—the de facto government of Afghanistan, in
control of some 90 percent of its territory—deployed regular armed forces
against the U.S. invasion and at least three countries recognized it as the de jure
government of Afghanistan.281 In 2002, after insisting the military mission in
Afghanistan was not an armed conflict and the laws of war did not apply, the
Bush Administration admitted its error, but still insisted captured combatants
could not be provided with Geneva Conventions protection, a move one scholar
has labeled “schizophrenic . . . illogical and devoid of legal merit.”282
Regardless of the Bush Administration’s claims, the nature of the armed
conflict suggests international humanitarian law applies to the U.S.-Afghani-
stan war and persons detained during the conflict should be treated as prisoners
of war.283 As prisoners of war, detainees must be treated pursuant to Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions, which requires the capturer treat the prisoners
humanely and protect them from danger284 as well as public curiosity,285 and
supply them with food, clothing, and medical care.286 Prisoners are also enti-
tled to due process rights, including trial by courts that respect the same stan-
dards of justice as those that would be used to try the military of the detaining
state.287 Use of coercion to extract information is not allowed and the detaining
state may only require prisoners to disclose their names, date of birth, and rank
or position within the armed forces.288 Furthermore, prisoners may not be pros-
ecuted for engaging with lawful acts of war, although serious violations of
international humanitarian law may be prosecuted.289 Finally, when hostilities
have ceased, prisoners must be repatriated.290 If any doubt exists about the
279 JENNIFER ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TREATMENT OF ‘BATTLEFIELD DETAINEES’ IN
THE WAR ON TERRORISM 11 (2003), available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/
crsreports/crsdocuments/RL31367_09172003.pdf; see also Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 2–3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. at 3318–20, 75
U.N.T.S. at 136–38. However, the nature of the conflict may have changed as of June 19,
2002, once the Taliban government had been definitively ousted and a new government,
friendly to the United States, took its place. For more discussion, see HELEN DUFFY, THE
‘WAR ON TERROR’ AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 256–57 (2005).
280 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, List of State
Parties and Signatories, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=375&ps=P
(last visited Jan. 20, 2012).
281 ELSEA, supra note 279, at 11; PAUST supra note 83, at 1–2.
282 Jordan J. Paust, War and Enemy Status After 9/11: Attacks on the Laws of War, 28 YALE
J. INT’L L. 325, 325–26 (2003).
283 See Memorandum from Colin L. Powell to Counsel to the President, supra note 264;
Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at Guantanamo, supra note 264; RATNER & RAY, supra note
49, at 10.
284 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 19, 6 U.S.T at
3334, 75 U.N.T.S. at 152.
285 Id. art. 13, at 3328, 75 U.N.T.S. at 146.
286 Id. art. 20, at 3334, 75 U.N.T.S. at 152.
287 Id. art. 84, 99–108, at 3382–84, 3392–3400, 75 U.N.T.S. at 200–02, 210–18.
288 Id. art. 17, at 3330–32, 75 U.N.T.S. at 148–50.
289 Id. art. 82–88, at 3382–86, 75 U.N.T.S. at 200–04.
290 Id. art. 118, at 3406, 75 U.N.T.S. at 224.
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entitlement to POW status, a competent tribunal must determine the prisoner’s
status; until it does, the prisoner is entitled to POW protections as a default
rule.291
The degree of armed conflict and the characteristics of the belligerent
groups—traditional measures for a state of war292—also suggest that the U.S.-
Afghanistan struggle rises to the level of conflict necessary to bind both parties
to international humanitarian law obligations.293 The Prize Cases, which con-
sidered Lincoln’s Confederate blockade during the Civil War, held “war may
exist without a declaration on either side” if hostilities are sufficiently
intense.294 While the Court did not provide examples of the types of actions
that would result in a state of war without a declaration, the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC) commentary to Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions lists a number of factors capable of invoking the Conven-
tions’ provisions,295 the most important of which is a state’s response to a per-
ceived threat.296 When a state uses regular or combat forces to respond to a
threat, the laws of war apply rather than the principles of domestic law enforce-
ment.297 Furthermore, when armed forces inflict death as a measure of first
resort, especially when the determination is made solely based on an individ-
ual’s status as a “hostile” or “enemy force” and not based on his or her threat-
ening conduct, a state of war exists.298 The United States used military force
against the threat posed by the Taliban’s alleged harboring of al Qaeda opera-
tives in Afghanistan and providing support to the group.299 While in Afghani-
stan, U.S. soldiers were instructed to inflict deadly force as a measure of first
291 Id. art. 5, at 3322–24, 75 U.N.T.S. at 140–42.
292 DETTER, supra note 59, at 18.
293 See DUFFY, supra note 279, at 257–58.
294 The Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862).
295 See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY, CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORA-
TION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 49–50
(Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/365-570006?Open
Document.
296 Corn, What Law Applies, supra note 14, at 17. The Correlates of War Project takes a
numeric approach to the existence of war, which exists when 1000 battle fatalities have
occurred. John Alan Cohan, Legal War: When Does it Exist, and When Does it End?, 27
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 221, 253–54 (2004). Another approach is the subjective
“state of war” doctrine, which dictates war exists when (1) a declaration of war is issued by
one state against another; (2) one state commits an act of aggression against another state
(i.e., blockade, interdiction, invasion by military troops, or other act typically regarded as
aggression); or (3) a state commits an act of aggression against another state and the latter
state, in deploying forces to repel the aggression, chooses to regard the circumstances as
establishing a state of war. Id. at 254–55.
297 Cohan, supra note 296, at 255; see also Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defense
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 (I.C.T.Y. Appeals
Chamber 1995). In this first case adjudicated by the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, the tribunal concluded that “an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort
to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authori-
ties and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.” Id. (emphasis
added).
298 Corn, What Law Applies, supra note 14, at 26–29. On the other hand, “[l]aw enforce-
ment activities, regulated by domestic law and international human rights standards, reserve
the use of deadly force as a measure of last resort.” Id. at 29.
299 Id. at 96.
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resort upon Taliban forces.300 Therefore, a state of war existed between the two
countries under Common Article 3 and combatants on both sides should have
received POW status upon capture.301
While the Geneva Conventions are clearly triggered by interstate or intra-
state warfare, al Qaeda is not a state actor and the pre-9/11 consensus was that
international humanitarian law would not apply in a conflict with such a non-
state actor; rather, domestic criminal law would govern as well as international
human rights law.302 The Bush administration, however, determined no law
applied in the war on terror.303 This “lawless” situation created a third world
outside the two traditional legal paradigms (the laws of war and domestic crim-
inal law), one that depended entirely upon the executive’s discretion and
notions of the laws of war, where the executive has complete discretion to
apply the draconian aspects of the laws of war without providing prisoners due
process under Geneva Article 3 and, as evidenced by Dilawar’s fate, without
treating them with humanity or with dignity.304 The Supreme Court ultimately
rebuked the President’s desire to deny Guanta´namo prisoners due process in
Boumediene, but as Al Maqaleh demonstrates, the tradition of selective appli-
cation of the Geneva Conventions is still entrenched in the current
administration.305
The Bush administration’s new paradigm—that no law applies in the war
on terror—ignores modern realities of warfare, where states are far more likely
to engage in armed conflicts with non-state actors than other states, and where
the idea that only states may wage war is anachronistic, more suited to the
high-sea battles of the sixteenth century than the transnational nature of bellig-
erent groups in the twenty-first century.306 Following the end of the First World
War and guided by a popular demand for self-determination by ethnographic
groups, the hold of the state-centric system of international relations loos-
300 Id. at 33.
301 DUFFY, supra note 279, at 256.
302 RATNER & RAY, supra note 49, at 16; Corn, Introduction, supra note 53, at xv.
303 Corn, Introduction, supra note 53, at xv. Memorandum from John Yoo, Assistant Att’y
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, and Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, Office of Legal
Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Dep’t of Def., on Military Interrogation
of Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the United States (Mar. 14, 2003), available at
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/yoo_army_torture_memo.pdf.
304 RATNER & RAY, supra note 49, at 17–18.
305 Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 209 (2009). Judge Bates issued an order
shortly after President Obama took office offering the new administration the opportunity to
change or refine its position as to the Bagram detainees. Government’s Response to this
Court’s Order of January 22, 2009, at 2, Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C.
2009) (No. 1:06CV01669), available at http://legaltimes.typepad.com/files/dojorder.pdf.
The Justice Department decided to adhere to the Bush Administration’s previously articu-
lated position. Id.
306 See DETTER, supra note 59, at 18. Detter uses the example of the Slovenian and Croatian
conflict in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, where the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav Federal
Army unsuccessfully attempted a halt in the independence movement. Id. Although Slovenia
and Croatia eventually emerged as sovereign States in 1991, the forces that stood against the
Federal Army were non-state actors. Id. This conflict was apparently “war” because the
subsequent trials before the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague applied the
Laws of War to Slobodan Milos˘eviæ and other officials. Id. at 18–19.
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ened.307 Internal conflicts between rebel forces and colonial powers birthed the
idea that non-state groups of individuals can bear international rights and duties
without being direct parties to the treaties that establish them.308 The concept
has only grown stronger as the age of modern warfare dawned.309 Therefore, al
Qaeda’s status as a non-state actor is irrelevant to the question of whether or
not the United States is at “war” with the group. The United States chose mili-
tary force as its weapon to combat the group and uses lethal force as a measure
of first resort, as exemplified by the 2002 targeted killing of high-level al
Qaeda member Qaed Senyan al-Harithi in Yemen310 and the recent killing of
Osama bin Laden in Pakistan.311 Furthermore, al Qaeda’s relationship with the
Taliban could make Common Article 4 of the Geneva Conventions applicable
to its forces.312
Since 9/11, the United States’ military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq
highlighted problems inherent in invoking the authority of the laws of war
without the humanitarian obligations that such laws bring with them.313 When
armed conflicts are correctly categorized as “wars” and prosecuted pursuant to
the Geneva Conventions or even customary law, armed forces may use military
necessity to justify the employment of deadly force while still limiting the
methods of warfare and establishing a baseline standard of humane treatment
for captured and detained personnel.314 While pure treaty-interpretation might
lead to the conclusion that the United States is engaged in an armed conflict
without being bound by the laws of war,315 as the Bush administration argued,
such an interpretation leads to problems in the field.316 Without the obligations
of international humanitarian law that come with a state of war, both combat-
ants and non-combatants run the risk of unnecessary suffering, persons who fall
307 Id. at 27.
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 David Johnston & David E. Sanger, Yemen Killing Based on Rules Set Out by Bush,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/06/international/middleeast/
06YEME.html.
311 Peter Baker et al., Bin Laden is Dead, Obama Says, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2011, at A1.
312 ELSEA, supra note 279, at 24. The ICRC’s Commentary to Article 4 states, “Every per-
son in enemy hands must have some status under international law: he is either a prisoner of
war and, as such, covered by the Third Convention, [or] a civilian covered by the Fourth
Convention . . . . There is no intermediate status; nobody in enemy hands can be outside the
law.” INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY, CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PRO-
TECTON OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 45 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960), http://
www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebPrint/380-600007-COM?OpenDocument (last visited Jan. 18,
2012).
313 See ELSEA, supra note 279, at 19.
314 Id. at 3 n.13.
315 RATNER & RAY, supra note 49, at 16. But see Jinks & Sloss, supra note 50, at 109
(“[P]arties to these treaties remain mutually bound, even if an opposing state is not a party to
the treaties.”).
316 RATNER & RAY, supra note 49, at 16. See discussion of how the Bush administration’s
policies led to Abu Ghraib in Reed Brody, The Road to Abu Ghraib, in AMERICA’S DISAP-
PEARED: DETAINEES, SECRET IMPRISONMENT, AND THE “WAR ON TERROR” 113, 113–16
(Rachel Meeropol, ed., 2005). See also Corn, What Law Applies, supra note 14, at 36 (“[A]ll
warriors must understand that when they ‘ruck up’ and ‘lock and load’ to conduct operations
during which an opponent will be destroyed on sight, the laws of war go with them.”).
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into the hands of the enemy might not receive basic human protections, and
peace becomes more difficult to reestablish.317
The United States is indeed engaged in a “war” in Afghanistan from both
practical and legal standpoints. Thus, the D.C. Circuit was correct in Al
Maqaleh when it correctly identified Bagram Airfield an active theater of war,
as it is located in the Kandahar province, an “area of air, land, and water that is,
or may become, directly involved in the conduct of the war.”318 However,
given this determination, the D.C. Circuit misidentified the consequences of the
theater of war status and failed to bind the administration to the international
humanitarian obligations attached to international warfare. Because Bagram is
located within a theater of war, the laws of warfare must apply, including due
process rights for detainees. Therefore, the D.C. Circuit should have affirmed
the District Court’s habeas grant rather than denying it.
VI. SOLUTIONS: FIGHT TO PROTECT OUR LIVES, FIGHT TO PROTECT
OUR PRINCIPLES
Treating detainees like prisoners from a legal standpoint by allowing them
access to federal courts or providing them with Geneva protections would be
the first step in the right direction of conducting the war in Afghanistan and on
terror in a way consummate with American values. While the D.C. Circuit’s
selective reading of Boumediene could easily be reversed if it were appealed to
the Supreme Court, proposing a solution to the problem of litigating detainee
actions in the twenty-first century is more difficult. Most scholars agree that the
problem ultimately stems from legislative inaction, at best, or Congressional
acquiescence to the whims of an executive seeking to push the limits of presi-
dential power, at worst.319
Thus, at first glance, the solution seems simple: have Congress declare
war on Afghanistan and al Qaeda. A declaration of war would clearly invoke
Geneva protections while providing for a higher level of congressional authori-
zation to match the amount of discretion the president is currently utilizing.
However, such an action could bring with it unintended consequences, such as
symbolically aggrandizing al Qaeda’s status from a “sinister criminal organiza-
tion” to a legitimate belligerent group, as well as immunizing its members from
proportional attacks against American military targets.320 Furthermore, a decla-
317 JEREMY BALL ET AL., JUDGE ADVOCATE GENS. LEGAL CTR. & SCH., OPERATIONAL LAW
HANDBOOK 12 (John Rawcliffe ed., 2007).
318 DAVID H. PETRAEUS & JAMES F. AMOS, THE U.S. ARMY MARINE CORPS COUNTERIN-
SURGENCY FIELD MANUAL NO. 3-24 388 (2007).
319 See, e.g., ELSEA, supra note 279, at 51 (“Despite the constitutional powers listed above,
Congress has not generally taken an active rule [sic] in prescribing the treatment of prisoners
of war.”); PAUST, supra note 83, at 131 (“Congress should revise the Military Commissions
Act to comply with constitutional and international legal requirements.”); WHEELER, supra
note 108, at 163 (“Many have pointed an accusing finger at Congress for the vague and
wide-ranging grant of power given to the president in the AUMF. Such a grant was an open
invitation to an executive already seeking opportunities to reclaim ‘lost’ presidential
powers.”)
320 Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT’L LAW 1, 20–21
(2003).
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ration might have the perverse effect of enlarging the President’s discretion to
prosecute the global war on terror as he sees fit, without a meaningful counter-
balance of Congressional oversight (although some might argue this phenome-
non is already in effect). Given the declaration of war’s status as a “moribund
anachronism,”321 a declaration of war would be an ineffective, post-facto
attempt to correct the many mistakes the nation has made in prosecuting the
military mission in the Middle East. Therefore, the wiser solution would be to
return the United States’ prisoner policy to its status before 9/11, where detain-
ees are either treated “as if” they are prisoners of war or prosecuted criminally
in domestic courts for actions on U.S. soil violating U.S. law. This approach
would avoid problems of “legal black holes,” regardless of where the executive
chooses to house prisoners in the future while insuring a policy of humane
treatment.
A more subtle solution to the problem involves reevaluating the ethical
underpinnings of detainee treatment in general. As Justice O’Connor explained
in Hamdi, “It is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that . . .
we must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which we fight
abroad.”322 The United States, as a nation, must grapple with the difficult
issues of approaching warfare in a way that respects the value of human life
while simultaneously protecting the safety of its own citizens. Perhaps the ethi-
cal answers to society’s future challenges lie in theories of the past. “Just war”
theory, a doctrine of military ethics dating all the way back to Roman times,
proffers that participants in armed conflict may engage in hostilities while still
respecting human life and dignity.323 The theory is codified in international
humanitarian law in the familiar phrase jus in bello (violence may be employed
during war in ways commensurate with our values324), which is an organizing
principle for many of the Geneva protections.325 The most useful parts of just
war theory for modern society are the concepts of proportionality and discrimi-
nation, implemented to avoid total war and conflicts that target the lives and
livelihoods of the enemy’s citizenry and result in destructive battle-to-the-death
scenarios.326
Just war theory proposes the means employed in war should be propor-
tionate to the gravity of (1) the actual harm incurred and (2) the perceived
321 Robert Turner, The War on Terrorism and the Modern Relevance of the Congressional
Power to “Declare War”, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 519, 537 (2002).
322 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532 (2004).
323 See generally MICHEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS (4th ed. 2006).
324 PATTERSON, supra note 66, at 2. Compare jus ad bellum, which asks under what condi-
tions is it moral to go to war, and jus post bellum, which asks how we engage justice at the
war’s end. Id.
325 DUFFY, supra note 279, at 217.
326 PATTERSON, supra note 66, at 60–61. Patterson uses the example of the three Punic
Wars, which resulted in the razing of Carthage in 146 B.C. and made the area uninhabitable
for decades. Id. at 61. Another example of total war is the Pacific Theater in World War II,
which included the Pearl Harbor attack, the Bataan Death March, and the atomic bombs in
Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Id. These incidents were part of the American policy of uncondi-
tional surrender, which arguably resulted in a longer, costlier, and uglier conflict than was
necessary or cost-efficient. Id. at 61.
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threat.327 However, in the post-9/11 era, developing a proportionate response to
terrorism has proven problematic. Al Qaeda is a group of “criminals and ideo-
logues who not only speak of violence, but act upon it as well, [as it kills] men,
women, and children in [its] own neighborhoods and abroad.”328 In the past,
the United States has dealt with terrorists as criminals, not combatants. After 9/
11, however, it became harder to conceptualize terrorists as mere criminals
because members of al Qaeda engaged in traditional acts of warfare by killing
thousands of American civilians, causing billions of dollars in damage, and
trying to eliminate leaders of the American government.329 Furthermore, al
Qaeda members continue to use the language of warfare, calling themselves the
“army of Allah” and consistently refer to the jihad (holy war) with the West,
making al Qaeda sound more like a group of combatants, not a group of
criminals.330 However tempting it may be to use this language in order to jus-
tify an approach that throws international and domestic law out the window, as
al Qaeda appears to have done, a proportionate response to this multidimen-
sional threat cannot be restricted solely to the raw use of military power—
rather, it must include diplomacy, economics, and politics as well.331
Furthermore, discrimination means something more than distinguishing
between civilians, who are supposed to be shielded from hostilities, and com-
batants; it means distinguishing those who constitute an active threat from
those who do not.332 Discrimination means that “when an enemy becomes a
prisoner, he or she is treated like a prisoner,” but when the enemy returns to the
battlefield, law enforcement procedures no longer apply.333 In most conflicts
today, the discrimination decision is made by the soldier in the field, “at a
roadblock or checkpoint as an unidentified person or vehicle approaches,” but a
soldier ultimately relies on the policies and training provided by his superiors to
make his decision.334 As evidenced by the abuse at Bagram and Abu Ghirab,
soldiers have not been properly trained about the potential consequences of
their actions under international law.335 Without sufficient information to deter-
327 Id. at 63.
328 Id. at 64.
329 See John Yoo’s interview justifying his interpretation of the Geneva Conventions in
TAXI TO THE DARK SIDE, supra note 2.
330 DUFFY, supra note 279, at 64–65.
331 PATTERSON, supra note 66, at 65. Stephen R. Shalom argues the failure of the United
States to exhaust its nonmilitary remedies before going to war resulted in a disproportionate
military response which allowed prisoner abuse and civilian suffering due to indiscriminate
bombing and lack of food. Stephen R. Shalom, Far from Infinite Justice: Just War Theory
and Operation Enduring Freedom, 26 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 623, 696–97 (2009).
332 PATTERSON, supra note 66, at 70.
333 Id. at 72.
334 Id. at 73.
335 Sgt. Thomas Curtis, an MP at Bagram who interacted with Dilawar, told filmmakers, “I
don’t remember hearing anything about Geneva Convention. Um—of course I’m familiar
with it, but they didn’t go over that, you know, in-in any kind of detail.” TAXI TO THE DARK
SIDE, supra note 2. Pfc. Damien Corsetti, an interrogator at Bagram, admitted,
I didn’t know what the Field Manual for Interrogation [was]. I didn’t know the proper nomencla-
ture for it. I had seen it. There was a copy lying around, I’m sure, somewhere. And if I had
chosen to, I could have picked it up and read it. But I was working sixteen-hour days. To sit
down and read a Field Manual was not top of my priorities over there.
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mine what level of force should be applied to whom, soldiers will continue to
take the fall for administration-level mistakes in policy.336
The United States’ policy needs to be clear, just, and realistic in order for
soldiers in the field to apply the policy in a way that is consummate with our
values and effective in promoting a workable peace. The tactics the military
uses to incentivize capture of insurgents is flawed; large cash rewards are
offered by way of flyers for the presentation of personnel with the simple dec-
laration that they are members of the resistance, and no corroboration of the
allegations is necessary before the military takes a person into custody.337 This
policy led to the phenomenon of local warlords rounding up groups of civilians
and presenting them to U.S. forces, claiming they participated in an attack.338
With up to $5,000 in their pocket for each prisoner, the warlords returned to
their territory and use the funds for a variety of purposes, including funding the
insurgency.339 Many of these prisoners were completely innocent and were
eventually released by the military, but only after the traumatic and resource-
intensive booking and interrogation process.340
The failures of proportionality and discrimination at Bagram and Abu
Ghirab resulted in the gratuitous abuse of prisoners in U.S. custody filling news
feeds worldwide.341 These incidents show U.S. policy about treatment of pris-
oners is not clear to the soldiers on the ground. Rumsfeld’s memos regarding
interrogation techniques at Guanta´namo were vague,342 probably on purpose to
Id.
336 At a press conference on September 15, 2006, President Bush responded to the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Hamdan:
This debate is occurring because of the Supreme Court’s ruling that said that we must conduct
ourselves under the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention. And that Common Article 3
says that . . . there will be no outrages upon human dignity . . . it’s very vague. What does that
mean, ‘outrages upon human dignity’? That’s a statement that is wide open to interpretation.
Transcript: President Bush Pushes Torture Rules and Tribunals Plan, PBS NEWSHOUR
(Sept. 15, 2006), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/july-dec06/bush_09-15.html. Of
the Bagram interrogators, Pfc. Willie Brand was convicted of assault, maiming, and mal-
treatment. TAXI TO THE DARK SIDE, supra note 2. Sgt. Anthony Morden pled guilty to
assault and dereliction of duty. Id. Spc. Glendale Walls pled guilty to assault and dereliction
of duty. Id.
337 FLETCHER & STOVER, supra note 3, at 20–21.
338 Gopal, supra note 168. The Northern Alliance and local warlords eventually picked up
as many as 35,000 or 40,000 people in response to the United States flyers. RATNER & RAY,
supra note 49, at 9. These groups “started turning over their enemies or anyone they didn’t
like, or finally, anyone they could pick up.” Id.
339 FLETCHER & STOVER, supra note 3, at 19, 21.
340 Gopal, supra note 168. The detentions may have more sinister, unanticipated conse-
quences of turning possible allies against the United States.
31 [Guanta´namo detainees interviewed after their release] said their opinion of the United States
changed from positive to negative as a result of their experiences in U.S. custody. . . . Many
respondents expressed feelings of bitterness that, in their view, the United States had disregarded
the rule of law and humanitarian principles. ‘We never imagined Americans, the country that
was the defender of democracy, would treat anybody like this,’ remarked one. An Afghan
respondent noted that the U.S. supported Afghan forces when they were fighting the Russians,
but had turned on these same fighters after 9/11.
FLETCHER & STOBER, supra note 3, at 111.
341 See Golden, supra note 4; see also Mazzetti, supra note 242.
342 PAUST, supra note 83, at 14–15.
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avoid Geneva implications. An interrogator at Bagram recounted the difficulty
when dealing with detainees:
A lot of pressure came from the fact that we had a few high value detainees that gave
a lot of good information. And when we started to lose those detainees due to going
to Guantanamo Bay, that they expected this to come from everybody. . . . We would
interrogate some of these guys just to interrogate them. And it was ridiculous. I
mean, you’d get some of these guys in and you’re like ‘This is the wrong man. This
is not who we’re supposed to have . . . .’ They’d be like ‘Hey, we want you to go yell
at this guy.’ So I’d grab my box of Frosted Flakes that I was eating for breakfast that
morning, and I’d go into the room, and I’d be like ‘Alright, I have to yell at you
today.’ So I’d be like ‘dehydrogenated salt substitute.’ And just start yelling at them.
And they’d be like, they’d look at me all crazy, and I’d be like ‘Yeah! That’s your
fault they put that in my cereal now.’ Or I’d yell at them if Elvis was really King of
Rock, or if he was dead. Or stuff like that. And I’d write that in my interrogation
summaries. And I’d send that up to higher that that’s what I did for that two
hours.343
Yelling at shackled prisoners about the ingredients in Frosted Flakes is
neither proportionate nor discriminatory to the military mission in Afghanistan.
Yet, soldiers were instructed these tactics were the only way to catch Osama
bin Laden344 and were held solely accountable when things went wrong.345 The
military’s preoccupations with potentially low-level insurgents, especially in
light of al Qaeda’s decentralized command structure, are not discriminatory
because interrogation and detention of such forces are unlikely to actively pro-
mote an end of hostilities.346
The detainee cases all stem from the administration’s continued insistence
on treating detainees like combatants, not prisoners. Once in custody, the
detainees no longer pose an active threat to military personnel. They may have
information useful to the military, but the sort of brute force publicized by the
Dilawar and Abu Ghirab incidents is not the only tool in the military’s informa-
tion-gathering toolbox.347 As John McCain aptly stated during a Senate Armed
Services committee meeting, “Now, they may be al Qaeda, they may be
343 Interviews with Pfc. Damien Corsetti, 519th Military Intelligence Unit, Bagram, and
Spc. Glendale Walls, who interrogated Dilawar at Bagram. TAXI TO THE DARK SIDE, supra
note 2.
344
“‘When was the last time you saw Osama bin Laden? When was the last time you saw
Mohamed Atta?’ Now, this was a standard question that they would ask of every detainee.”
Id. Yet, the intelligence that ultimately led U.S. forces to Osama’s compound came not from
coercive techniques, but from following Osama’s courier’s Suzuki as it drove through Abot-
tobad, Pakistan. Mark Mazzetti et al., Behind the Hunt for Bin Laden, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/03/world/asia/03intel.html.
345 Interrogators at Bagram were charged with or convicted of assault, maiming, maltreat-
ment, dereliction of duty, and performing an indecent act, and many of them sent to correc-
tional facilities for their actions in the Dilawar and Habibullah cases. TAXI TO THE DARK
SIDE, supra note 2. No officer, however, was ever convicted in Dilawar’s case. Id. Following
her management of the Abu Ghraib interrogators during the scandal, Capt. Carolyn Wood
was given a staff position training new interrogators at the Army Interrogation School in
Arizona. Id.
346 See Adam Klein, Note, The End of Al Qaeda? Rethinking the Legal End of the War on
Terror, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1885–86 (2010).
347 Jack Cloonan, of the Counterterrorism Task Force, outlined the FBI’s approach to infor-
mation gathering in his interview for TAXI TO THE DARK SIDE, supra note 2.
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Taliban, they may be the worst people in the world—and I’m sure that some of
them are—but there are certain basic rules and international agreements that the
United States has agreed to, that we will observe.”348 And these rules must be
observed if the United States wishes to escape from the tricky corner it has
painted itself into with its detainee policies.
CONCLUSION
In this age of terrorism and moral relativism, one conclusion emerges
clearly: Al Maqaleh endorsed a distinctly un-American view of the fundamen-
tal rights of prisoners. By refusing to extend Boumediene beyond Guanta´namo,
the D.C. Circuit invited the executive to implement an “ends justifies the
means” thinking about wartime detention, a position that runs contrary to two
and a half centuries of legal thought and humanitarian values. Prisoners are
prisoners, whether they are Americans or foreign nationals; the human impact
of indefinite detention knows no state or military boundaries. Were Dilawar an
American, his suffering would not have been any less tragic and offensive to
basic concepts of justice. However, with no access to federal courts, similarly
situated prisoners will effectively remain banished inside the razor-wire fences
of Bagram.
The “practical concerns” at issue in Al Maqaleh may be compelling on
their own, but taken in the context of the bigger picture of the United States’
conduct during the war on terror, they provide a dire warning. The modern
imperial presidency can prosecute military endeavors as it sees fit, with little
oversight, be it judicial, legislative, or international, so long as it claims mili-
tary necessity. The Al Maqaleh District Court tried to draw a firm line in the
sand for limiting executive power, but the D.C. Circuit dipped its brush into the
sanitizing white paint of executive deference and erased that line, staining it
instead with the mark of War.
However, if the United States is at war with al Qaeda, then the laws of war
apply, including international humanitarian obligations. The president cannot
and should not discount these obligations simply because they are difficult to
afford.
You want to be able to build a rapport with somebody, you are their salvation, because their life
as they know it is over. ‘Is there something I can do for your kids? You concerned about them?
Do you want them educated? I’ll get them educated. What do you want? Tell me what you want.
Script for me your exit strategy. How do you extricate yourself from this terrible situation that,
by the way, you put yourself in? Now, you can’t go back home, can you? No. So let’s make
peace with that. Let me help you find this strategy to give you a life.’ And that’s the way it
worked. The amount of information that they were able to provide us, pre-9/11, to me it was
extremely valuable. Who else was going to tell us about how you joined al Qaeda? . . . So when
we got all that information, we were able to do certain operations. Cumbersome though it may
be, it still to me was the way to do it. And we don’t have to apologize to anybody.
Id.
348 U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing on Treatment of Guantanamo Bay
Detainees, July 13, 2005 (transcript available at http://humanrights.ucdavis.edu/projects/the-
guantanamo-testimonials-project/testimonies/testimonies-of-the-defense-department/senate-
armed-services-committee-hearing-on-guantanamo-bay-detainee-treatment).
